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Article 3

Redefining Prey and Predator in Class
Actions
Christine P. Bartholomew†
INTRODUCTION
On its face, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 appears
neutral. Rule 23, which governs the procedures for collective
actions, does not explicitly support or condemn class actions.
Instead, it seems merely a procedural rule to aggregate related
claims. In application, however, it is hardly neutral.
Courts are increasingly skeptical of class claims and the
attorneys who bring them. Class actions are often treated as
the Big Bad of modern day civil procedure—in need of
banishment, or, at a minimum, significant restraint. Namecalling is now commonplace: class actions have been branded
everything from “monstrosities”1 to “a plethora of evils”2 to
“inherently corrupt.”3 The harsher name-calling, though, is

† Associate Professor, SUNY Buffalo School of Law. The author would like to
thank Martha McCluskey, Martha Fineman, Rebecca French, Colleen Raimond,
Jessica Houston Su, Athena Mutua, Vic Amar, and Stephen Paskey for their insightful
feedback and encouragement. Thanks also to the organizers and participants at the
2014 Vulnerability, Resilience, and Public Responsibility for Social and Economic
Justice Conference, where an early version of this Article was presented. Finally,
special thanks to my research assistants, Kathleen Wysocki and Andrew Clement, for
their invaluable insight and hard-work.
1 Francis R. Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation—Have Good Intentions Gone
Awry?, in THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 220 (A. Leo
Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979) (large cases including class actions are “monstrosities”).
2 Willy E. Rice, Allegedly “Biased,” “Intimidating,” and “Incompetent” State
Court Judges and the Questionable Removal of State Law Class Actions to Purportedly
“Impartial” and “Competent” Federal Courts—A Historical Perspective and an
Empirical Analysis of Class Action Dispositions in Federal and State Courts, 19252011, 3 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 419, 464 (2012) (internal citations omitted)
(discussing criticisms of class actions).
3 Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L.
REV. 1051, 1055 (1996); cf. David J. Kahne, Curbing the Abuser, Not the Abuse: A Call
for Greater Professional Accountability and Stricter Ethical Guidelines for Class Action
Lawyers, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 741, 742 (2006) (describing class actions as a
“corrupt” process that “continues unabated”).
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reserved for class action attorneys: the “bounty-hunters,”
“greedy hustlers,” and “extortionists” of the justice system.4
With the growth of this heavily rhetoric-laden messaging,
potential for public good has become secondary to concerns that
class actions bog down the judicial system5 and present a
danger to efficient marketplaces.6 Capitalizing on themes of
market efficiency and individual autonomy, much class action
scholarship encourages reform, thereby narrowing class
actions.7 Consequently, consumers lose a potentially strong
source of private regulation—particularly for business torts.
This, in turn, protects corporate defendants from liability
because without a procedural mechanism for aggregating
claims, individuals will not realistically seek to redress
corporate wrongdoing.8

4 See, e.g., Lisa L. Casey, Reforming Securities Class Actions from the Bench:
Judging Fiduciaries and Fiduciary Judging, 2003 BYU L. REV. 1239, 1243 (discussing
how “corporate defendants, reform-minded legislators, and the business press”
characterize class action counsel as “greedy,” “extortionist” “bounty hunters”); John C.
Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as
Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 236-61 (1983); see also 141 CONG.
REC. S9173 (daily ed. June 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Mikulski); Mike France, 23:
Don’t Kill All the Trial Lawyers, BUS. WK. (Aug. 25, 2002), http://www.bloomberg.com/
bw/stories/2002-08-25/23-dont-kill-all-the-trial-lawyers (arguing against negative
perceptions of plaintiffs’ attorneys); Evan Schaeffer, Class Actions Deter Corporate
Wrongdoing, ROANOKE TIMES (Feb. 23, 2001), http://www.evanschaeffer.com/classactions-deter-corporate-wrongdoing.html.
5 See, e.g., Brief for Appellants at 19, In re Vertrue Inc. Mktg. & Sales
Practices Litig., 719 F.3d 474 (6th Cir. 2014) (No. 10-3928); Dan B. Dobbs, Awarding
Attorney Fees Against Adversaries: Introducing the Problem, 1986 DUKE L.J. 435, 436
(discussing judicial drain caused by aspects of class actions); Jerold S. Solovy & Robert M.
Mendillo, Calculating Class Action Awards: Is It Time to Unload the Lodestar?, NAT’L L.J.,
May 2, 1983, at 19 (discussing how fee petitions in class actions create judicial waste).
6 William E. Kovacic, The Institutions of Antitrust Law: How Structure
Shapes Substance, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1019, 1041 (2012) (book review) (noting the “U.S.
style of private rights of action . . . pose[s] serious risks of overdeterrence”); Amanda M.
Rose, The Multienforcer Approach to Securities Fraud Deterrence: A Critical Analysis,
158 U. PA. L. REV. 2173, 2176 (2010) (arguing securities class actions bring about
overregulation of the securities markets).
7 See, e.g., Rice, supra note 2, at 552-53 (“[C]lass action reformers have
argued that forcing corporations and national insurers to defend themselves and
litigate ‘nationwide class actions’ in state courts is inefficient and unfair, because each
state court judge has to weigh and apply, if necessary, fifty-one different sets of
substantive laws to resolve each dispute.”); Eric P. Voigt, A Company’s Voluntary
Refund Program for Consumers Can Be a Fair and Efficient Alternative to a Class
Action, 31 REV. LITIG. 617, 623 (2012).
8 Consumer class actions include violations of antitrust and consumer
protection laws. Putative class members, in the majority of these cases, are individual
consumers or perhaps small businesses. In contrast, the defendants are predominately
large national or international corporate defendants. Securities, employment, and
environmental class actions are beyond the scope of this article. The plaintiffs in such
cases are not consumers, and consequently warrant slightly different analyses.
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By prioritizing efficiency over public good, rhetoric has
redefined the “victim” in class actions. Individual consumers, or
putative class members, are no longer seen as the victims of
corporate defendants’ malfeasance. Instead, building on dicta from
one Seventh Circuit decision,9 defendants are advancing
arguments that class action procedures harm corporate defendants
by forcing them into extortionist settlements.10 Successful class
action attorneys have been redefined as the predators with
corporations as their prey.11
This “blackmail myth”12 continues to grow and undermine
class action utility, with the last decade seeing unparalleled efforts
to limit class actions.13 With the assistance of Congress and judges,
class action mechanisms under Rule 23 are eroding. It is now more
difficult to state a class claim, certify a class, and survive summary
judgment than it has been since the birth of the modern class
action in 1966.14 Whether a serious injury afflicts a substantial
class is now secondary to procedural battles. Class claims rarely

9 In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995) (“But
[defendants] could not be confident that the defenses would prevail. They might,
therefore, easily be facing $25 billion in potential liability (conceivably more), and with
it bankruptcy. They may not wish to roll these dice. That is putting it mildly. They will
be under intense pressure to settle.”).
10 See, e.g., Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d
154, 167-68 n.8 (3d Cir. 2001); Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir.
1996); Barreras Ruiz v. Am. Tobacco Co., 180 F.R.D. 194, 198 (D.P.R. 1998); In re Dow
Corning Corp., 211 B.R. 545, 585 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1997).
11 Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 738
(2013) (noting criticism of class actions grow along with the success of some plaintiffs lawyers).
12 For a thorough discussion of the blackmail myth and its fallacy, see generally
Allan Kanner & Tibor Nagy, Exploding the Blackmail Myth: A New Perspective on Class
Action Settlements, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 681 (2005). In essence, branded as extortionists,
plaintiff class action attorneys are primarily characterized as greedy entrepreneurs
preying on corporate defendants. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 104-50, at 15 (1995); see also In
re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 784-85
(3d Cir. 1995) (“Another problem is that class actions create the opportunity for a kind of
legalized blackmail: a greedy and unscrupulous plaintiff might use the threat of a large
class action, which can be costly to the defendant, to extract a settlement far in excess of
the individual claims’ actual worth.”); Lisa L. Casey, Class Action Criminality, 34 J.
CORP. L. 153, 168 (2008) (describing how corporate lobbyists characterize class action
attorneys as extortionists); Examiner Editorial: Greedy Class-Action Lawyers Take It on
the Chin, WASH. EXAMINER (Feb. 21, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://washingtonexaminer.com/
examiner-editorial-greedy-class-action-lawyers-take-it-on-the-chin/article/2522230.
13 See, e.g., Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711-15
(2006); Daniel E. Lazaroff, Entry Barriers and Contemporary Antitrust Litigation, 7
U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 1, 46-51 (2006).
14 For a thorough discussion of increased gatekeeping under the Roberts
Court, see generally Howard M. Wasserman, The Roberts Court and the Civil
Procedure Revival, 31 REV. LITIG. 313 (2012).
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reach merit-based determinations, as procedural hurdles that
create barriers to resolving liability continue to rise.15
The current theoretical frameworks for evaluating class
actions favor corporate defendants. Coloring those discussions
is an underlying assumption that defendants are found liable
too often.16 Building on this questionable assumption, critics
advance cost-benefit justifications to spur judicial aversion to
class actions’ regulatory potential.17 These frameworks favor
marketplace correction over private enforcement, and thus
encourage courts to curb class actions.18
Other theories, such as those rooted in autonomy, focus
more on the role of plaintiff class action attorneys and their
decision-making power over class members. Autonomy arguments
conflict with collective action as group treatment necessarily
diminishes individual participation.19 Not every class member’s
voice is equally heard.20 Thus, some scholars use these principles
to argue against class actions because of their potential to
“subvert[ ] individual autonomy.”21
What is missing from the dialogue is a theoretical
framework to counterbalance this defendant-orientated literature
and evaluate class actions from class members’ perspectives.
In presenting this discussion, the point is not to be polemic.
Rather, it is to provide a competing narrative to challenge the
current anti-class action animus.

15 This push away from merit-based determinations is occurring across civil
litigation. See Edward D. Cavanagh, Making Sense of Twombly, 63 S.C. L. REV. 97, 119
(2011) (discussing data on the vanishing trial).
16 See, e.g., JoEllen Lind, The End of Trial on Damages? Intangible Losses
and Comparability Review, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 251, 325 (2003) (discussing how law and
economic literature assumes “defendants are found liable too often and pay too much”).
17 See Joseph William Singer, Pay No Attention to That Man Behind the
Curtain: The Place of Better Law in a Third Restatement of Conflicts, 75 IND. L.J. 659,
663 (2000) (“[S]ome law and economics scholars want us to presume that plaintiffs
should lose torts cases, with some narrow exceptions, because they believe that
generally losses should lie where they fall . . . .”).
18 104 CONG. REC. S17,997 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995); 104 CONG. REC. H2760-80
(daily ed. Mar. 7, 1995); House Passes Securities Class Action Litigation Reform Bill,
TECH L.J. (July 23, 1998), http://www.techlawjournal.com/seclaw/80723.htm.
19 See, e.g., Alexandra D. Lahav, Due Process and the Future of Class Actions,
44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 545, 554-55 (2012).
20 See,
e.g., Patrick Woolley, Rethinking the Adequacy of Adequate
Representation, 75 TEX. L. REV. 571 (1997) (arguing that absent class members need
more opportunity to be heard).
21 Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Aggregation, Community, and the Line
Between, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 889, 890 (2010); see, e.g., Laura J. Hines, The Dangerous
Allure of the Issue Class Action, 79 IND. L.J. 567, 568 (2004) (“Class actions entail a
significant displacement of fundamental individual autonomy rights warranted only by
necessity or inferred consent.”).
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This Article attempts to fill that gap using Professor
Martha Fineman’s vulnerability theory.22 Vulnerability theory
has been applied in a variety of fields, ranging from disability
law23 to animal rights24 to disaster response.25 To date, though,
there has been limited application of this theory to judicial
procedural rules, making this Article not only innovative but
also a logical extension of vulnerability theory’s challenge to
define the appropriate role of the state and its institutions,
including the judiciary.26 In an attempt to introduce the theory
to those less familiar with it, the basic tenets are as follows:
(1) Everyone is vulnerable at some point in life.
(2) The vulnerable subject should replace the current, autonomous
juridical ideal.
(3) Equal treatment of the vulnerable subject does not sufficiently
overcome vulnerability.
(4) Resiliency assets (such as human, physical, and social assets that
empower the vulnerable) are key to mitigating vulnerability.
(5) Institutions, including the state, can provide resiliency assets.
(6) The state should actively promote resiliency assets when
developing and regulating institutions.

Layering vulnerability analysis on private consumer
class actions brings new dimension to the class action debate in
two ways. First, it offers a retrospective understanding of
judicial reluctance towards class actions. Second, it provides a
framework to respond to anti-class action rhetoric by stimulating

22 See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring
Equality in the Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 19-22 (2008) [hereinafter
Fineman, Anchoring Equality]; Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the
Responsive State, 60 EMORY L.J. 251 (2010) [hereinafter Fineman, Vulnerable Subject].
23 See Ani B. Satz, Disability, Vulnerability, and the Limits of Antidiscrimination,
83 WASH. L. REV. 513, 513 (2008).
24 See generally Ani B. Satz, Animals As Vulnerable Subjects: Beyond InterestConvergence, Hierarchy, and Property, 16 ANIMAL L. 65 (2009).
25 See Susan S. Kuo & Benjamin Means, After the Storm: The Vulnerability
and Resilience of Locally Owned Business, in VULNERABILITY: REFLECTIONS ON A NEW
ETHICAL FOUNDATION FOR LAW AND POLITICS 95 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Anna
Grear eds., 2013).
26 Cf. Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 22, at 265 (“I argued for a
more collective and institutionally shared notion approach to dependency: a
reallocation of primary responsibility for dependency that would place some obligation
on other societal institutions to share in the burdens of dependency, particularly those
associated with the market and the state.”).
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a more robust vision of class actions as a potential resiliency tool
for consumers.27
To that end, Part I of this Article encapsulates key
aspects of vulnerability scholarship to provide an essential
foundation. Part II applies this foundation to the history of class
actions. Using vulnerability analysis to reevaluate the seismic
shift against class actions shows how this shift is another
variation of the neoliberal, pro-corporate agenda. Part III
discusses how the current anti-class action sentiment is a
misguided effort to equalize justice without first considering the
parties’ pre-filing, pre-existing disadvantages, such as financial
and informational vulnerability. Finally, Part IV explores class
actions as essential resiliency tools, thus providing a new
justification for class actions. This justification identifies guiding
principles for the future of class action rhetoric.
I.

UNDERSTANDING VULNERABILITY THEORY

Attempting to distill vulnerability analysis into a handful
of pages is yeoman’s work given its richness and scope. To begin,
this Article opens by providing more detail on this theory,
including vulnerability scholarship’s characterization of the
current unresponsive state. Then, it explains how vulnerability
analysis emphasizes human vulnerability. At its core, the theory
proposes a two-part heuristic tool to interrogate the relationship
between the state and the individual.28 First, a vulnerable analysis
approach would examine how neoliberal notions of autonomy have
resulted in disparate result—whereby some groups are favored
and others disadvantaged. Second, after identifying the
disadvantaged (or vulnerable) group, applying this theory
requires identifying what state institutions can empower the
vulnerable group29—namely, consumers.
With this foundation in place, the Article moves on to
applying vulnerability theory to class actions.

27 Fineman, Anchoring Equality, supra note 22, at 19-22; Satz, supra note 23,
at 522 (“[V]ulnerability is part of the human experience, and the state must develop
structures to address substantive inequality and disadvantage.”).
28 Martha Albertson Fineman & Anna Grear, Introduction: Vulnerability as
Heuristic—An Invitation to Future Exploration, in VULNERABILITY: REFLECTIONS ON A NEW
ETHICAL FOUNDATION FOR LAW AND POLITICS 1, supra note 25 (describing vulnerability
theory as a “heuristic tool through which to interrogate the core concepts and conclusions of
liberal legal and political subjectivity and the structural arrangements they support”).
29 See id. at 2-3.
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Understanding the Neoliberal Status Quo

The starting point for vulnerability scholars is the
fundamental belief that state institutions play too minimal a
role in addressing disparities in society’s social and economic
well-being.30 Rather than advancing social justice, American
institutions—defined broadly to include legal institutions31—are
currently unresponsive:32 “Western societies have witnessed the
progressive withdrawal of the state’s responsibility for the
functioning of public institutions.”33 This scholarship identifies
two sources for this lack of responsiveness: (1) overly narrow
equality concepts, and (2) overly expansive autonomy concerns.34
Taken in turn, U.S. equal protection laws limit state
responsiveness.35 These laws encourage “sameness” in treatment.
However, this does not always result in justice, as sameness of
treatment does not equate to sameness in outcome. Formal equity
only provides the same opportunities to advantaged and
disadvantaged groups. Consequently, it does little to remedy
substantive inequalities.36 As Fineman explains, “Such a narrow
approach to equality is ineffective in combating the forces that have
resulted in the growing inequality in wealth, position, and power
experienced in the United States over the past few decades.”37

30 See Morgan Cloud, More than Utopia, in VULNERABILITY: REFLECTIONS ON
NEW ETHICAL FOUNDATION FOR LAW AND POLITICS 88, supra note 25; cf. Ani. B Satz,
Overcoming Fragmentation in Disability and Health Law, 60 EMORY L.J. 277, 322
(2010) (“A weak, unresponsive state would be one that largely does not regulate private
firms (i.e., regulation would likely address only safety) and probably provides no
antidiscrimination mandates or public health or disability benefits.”).
31 Cloud, supra note 30, at 71.
32 See Martha Albertson Fineman, Equality, Autonomy, and the Vulnerable
Subject in Law and Politics, in VULNERABILITY: REFLECTIONS ON A NEW ETHICAL
FOUNDATION FOR LAW AND POLITICS 18, supra note 25 [hereinafter Fineman, Equality]
(“I argued for a more collective and institutionally shared approach to dependency—a
reallocation of primary responsibility for dependency . . . particularly those associated
with the market and the state.”).
33 See Sean Coyle, Vulnerability and the Liberal Order, in VULNERABILITY:
REFLECTIONS ON A NEW ETHICAL FOUNDATION FOR LAW AND POLITICS 71, supra note 25.
34 See Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 22, at 254 (discussing the
tension between equality and autonomy); Fineman, Anchoring Equality, supra note 22,
at 2 (discussing how false equity and prioritizing of autonomy has led to a “rhetoric of
non-intervention [that] prevails in policy discussions”).
35 See Helen Carr, Housing the Vulnerable Subject: The English Context, in
VULNERABILITY: REFLECTIONS ON A NEW ETHICAL FOUNDATION FOR LAW AND POLITICS
108, supra note 25 (describing how concerns with U.S. equal protection laws spurred
the creation of vulnerability analysis).
36 See Satz, supra note 23, at 524.
37 See Fineman, Equality, supra note 32, at 14.
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According to vulnerability scholars, the current neoliberal
framework also uses autonomy to justify limited state response.38
The legal subject is currently defined as “fully capable and
functioning and therefore able to act with autonomy”39—free from
state action. As long as there is minimal equal treatment,
neoliberals believe concepts of individual autonomy and selfreliance will create a utopic meritocracy. State interference
with the market-place would upset this meritocracy; instead, a
“free market” will remedy any injustices in time, without state
intervention.40 This inhibits remedial action for disadvantaged
groups,41 including regulation or other kinds of assistance.42
Rather than addressing these inequalities, the state
has taken an apathetic approach to justify inaction, accepting
arguments about “individual responsibility” and the alleged
dangers of providing social welfare. When the state does act,
these are just momentary awakenings. These rare occasions
are often narrowly manifested to protect limited categories of
individuals rather than remedy broad discrimination or
disadvantage.43 As a result, by focusing on the autonomous
liberal legal subject in current political and legal thought, the
state overlooks “the material, social, and developmental
realities of the human condition.”44
Understood from this perspective, it is not surprising
that vulnerability scholars contend legal institutions presently
advantage corporations.45 A free market approach emphasizes
capitalist priorities46 that “systematically and adaptively”
privilege corporate power.47 The corporation becomes, in some
38 See Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 22, at 262; see also Rachel
Anne Fenton, Assisted Reproductive Technology Provision and the Vulnerability Thesis:
From the UK to the Global Market, in VULNERABILITY: REFLECTIONS ON A NEW
ETHICAL FOUNDATION FOR LAW AND POLITICS 126, supra note 25.
39 Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 22, at 262.
40 See Fineman, Equality, supra note 32, at 14; see also Coyle, supra note 33,
at 64 (“Human freedom is a more effective solver of problems than the government’s
legislative scheme.”).
41 Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 22, at 259.
42 See id. at 258; see also MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY
MYTH 10 (2004) [hereinafter FINEMAN, MYTH]
43 The Civil Rights Act is a key example of state action to equalize
disadvantage. See, e.g., Jonathan Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject at Work: A New
Perspective on the Employment At-will Debate, 43 SW. L. REV. 275, 288 (2013).
44 See id. at 298-99.
45 See, e.g., Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign Finance Law, 98 VA. L.
REV. 1, 13 (2012).
46 See Anna Grear, Vulnerability, Advanced Global Capitalism and CoSymptomatic Injustice: Locating the Vulnerable Subject, in VULNERABILITY: REFLECTIONS
ON A NEW ETHICAL FOUNDATION FOR LAW AND POLITICS 53, supra note 25.
47 Id. (emphasis omitted).
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ways, the ideal legal subject.48 It fulfills the autonomous ideal of a
disembodied, decontextualized person.49 By its very construction,
a corporation’s business structure minimizes individual players.
As Professor Grear explains, “the corporation is an artificial body
‘created by contract’ in which the . . . ‘corporeally specific
body . . . [produc[es] a] transmogrification of that corporeally
specific vulnerability into a ‘common Power.’”50
The Supreme Court’s growing acceptance of corporate
personhood demonstrates the bold advancement of the corporate
agenda.51 Now corporations have freedoms of religion and free
expression once afforded only to corporal individuals.52 At the same
time, the corporation’s disembodied nature can make it a difficult
target for legal accountability.53 Hence, current institutions afford
corporations favored status, including increased immunization
from wrongdoing, while disadvantaging the individuals impacted
by corporate misconduct. The corporate person is increasingly
treated equally as the autonomous human—without recognition
that such equal treatment often fails to remedy economic and
social disparities.
B.

Shifting Perspective to Consider Vulnerability

Instead of focusing on the autonomous juridical subject,
vulnerability theory offers an alternative framework for policy
discussion. The theory starts by replacing the autonomous person
with the vulnerable subject.54 “Vulnerable” in this context is not
intended to be a loaded or negative descriptor; rather, it is meant

Id. at 48-49.
Id. at 53; see also Saru M. Matambanadzo, The Body, Incorporated, 87 TUL.
L. REV. 457, 478 (2013) (“Corporations—legally constructed entities comprised of
capital, held together by contracts, and owned and operated by various other entities
and individuals—lack self-consciousness and are not subject to the vulnerabilities
arising from either death and illness or thinking and feeling.”).
50 See Grear, supra note 46, at 53; see also Shiloh Y. Whitney, Dependency
Relations: Corporeal Vulnerability and Norms of Personhood in Hobbes and Kittay, 26
HYPATIA 554, 554-74 (2011).
51 See, e.g., Zachary K. Ostro, Note, Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First
Derivative Traders: Further Limiting Limited Liability, and Missing an Opportunity to
Curb Corporate Misconduct, 8 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 275, 299 (2013) (“These holdings
represent the Court’s consistent inattention to needed corporate governance reform,
while drastically expanding protections for corporate entities.”).
52 See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13-354 (U.S. June 30, 2014)
(recognizing corporations’ ability to exercise religious beliefs); Citizens United v. Fed.
Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (affording corporations freedom of speech rights).
53 Grear, supra note 46, at 53.
54 Fenton, supra note 38, at 126.
48
49
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as distinct from traditional identity categories.55 The vulnerable
subject is intentionally broad and can change over time or in
differing circumstances.56 Vulnerability stems from variations in
the human condition or experience, including mental, intellectual,
social, material, and financial variations.57 It can also originate
from external perils, such as “disease pandemics, environmental
catastrophes, terrorism, crime, crumbling infrastructure, failing
institutions, recessions, corruption, and physical decline.”58 More
generally, political inequalities can also trigger vulnerability.59
Recognizing vulnerabilities is primary to identifying
models of state support and legal protection.60 This framing allows
for an analysis of whether the state, through its institutions and
mandates, inappropriately advantages or disadvantages segments
of society.61 Rather than focusing on equal treatment, then
passively leaving individuals to survive through independence
alone, a vulnerability theory approach considers ways to cushion
against such vulnerabilities.62 While a state free from all
vulnerability is impossible, the goal is to foster “resilience”—
meaning acquiring the assets and resources to help mitigate
such vulnerabilities.63 The ability to overcome the challenges
that arise in the embodied human experience depends on the
total resiliency one has developed.
The responsibility for acquiring resiliency tools is
shared by both individuals and the state. This is a notable shift
from the neoliberal framework, which focuses exclusively on the
individual, to instead require the state to shoulder shared

55 Fineman, Anchoring Equality, supra note 22, at 8-9 (“Vulnerability . . . freed
from its limited and negative associations is a powerful conceptual tool with the potential to
define an obligation for the state to ensure a richer and more robust guarantee of equality
than is currently afforded under the equal protection model.”).
56 Satz, supra note 24, at 79.
57 Martha
Albertson Fineman, Beyond Identities: The Limits of an
Antidiscrimination Approach to Equality, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1713, 1754 (2012) [hereinafter
Fineman, Beyond Identities]; see also Fineman, Equality, supra note 32, at 20 (discussing
how the human condition “carries with it the imminent or ever-present possibility of harm,
injury, and misfortune”).
58 Fineman, Beyond Identities, supra note 57, at 1753.
59 Id. at 1754.
60 Id. at 1752.
61 See Fineman, Anchoring Equality, supra note 22, at 2; see also Angela P.
Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 587 (1990)
(“Feminists have adopted the notion of multiple consciousness as appropriate to describe a
world in which people are not oppressed only or primarily on the basis of gender, but on the
bases of race, class, sexual orientation, and other categories in inextricable webs.”).
62 See J. Fineman, supra note 43, at 300.
63 See id.; PEADAR KIRBY, VULNERABILITY AND VIOLENCE: THE IMPACT OF
GLOBALISATION 55 (2006).
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responsibility.64 Consequently, the second step of the vulnerability
heuristic is to evaluate ways the state can respond to these
vulnerabilities. There is a need for a “responsive state” that
addresses vulnerabilities by promoting avenues of resilience: “the
state [should] be active, involved, and responsive to
vulnerability—monitoring institutions and better ensuring that
the promise of equality of access and opportunity is realized.”65
A responsive state should actively seek to encourage institutions
that promote resiliency. These state institutions include laws and
the judiciary.66 Advancing institutions that are responsive to
vulnerabilities results in greater equity, a more robust democracy,
and increased public participation.67 Thus, understanding the
vulnerable subject allows one to categorize, label, and discuss
obligations the state should undertake.68
Resiliency tools include human, physical, and social
assets.69 Human assets are generally “[d]efined as innate or
developed abilities to make the most of a given situation.”70
They include the ability to “participat[e] in the market” and
“accumulate[e] material resources.”71 Physical assets are the
material goods one possesses.72 These resources are central to
one’s “standard of living and ability to invest or respond to
economic crisis.”73 Social assets are the relationships from which
individuals derive support and strength.74 Social assets include
networks people can rely on to solve shared problems;75 thus,
Fineman, Anchoring Equality, supra note 22, at 12, 13.
Fineman & Grear, supra note 28, at 2, 3.
66 See John Handmer et al., Using Law to Reduce Vulnerability to Natural
Disasters, 14 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 13, 37 (2007).
67 See Fineman, Anchoring Equality, supra note 22, at 19.
68 Id. at 8-9.
69 This list is not exhaustive, as scholars also include environmental and
existential assets. See id. at 22.
70 Id. at 23.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 J. Fineman, supra note 43, at 302.
74 Id.
75 Kuo & Means, supra note 25, at 97. Professor Calmore’s discussion of social
capital informs vulnerability analysis’ definition of social assets. As he explains:
64

65

There are two primary dimensions to social capital. First, there is a social
glue aspect that refers to the degree to which people participate in group life.
It relates to the amount of trust or comfort one experiences when identifying
and participating in a social group. The second aspect of social capital is a
social bridging function that establishes links between groups. The bridges
are important, because “they not only connect groups to one another but also
give members in any one group access to the larger world outside their social
circle through a chain of affiliations.” Both the glue and bridge aspects must
be developed among the inner-city poor. In redressing their plight we must
keep in mind that both stability and mobility are important.
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opportunities to participate in groups have the potential to
offer resiliency.76 In this way, vulnerability differs greatly from
the neoliberal focus on the autonomous individual.77 The
“disconnected individual” may not coordinate efforts with
others to achieve a desired effect.78 Collective action can assist
in overcoming vulnerability, and thus should be encouraged by
a responsive state.79
Resiliency also includes broader assets, such as those aimed
at providing collective social good.80 Collective assets impact one’s
experiences, since individuals interact with “a web of economic and
institutional relationships.”81 Thus, unlike in the neoliberal
paradigm, vulnerability theory recognizes that everyone is
dependent on institutions that operate (sometimes without their
consent) to advance and develop their interests, identity, and
power through collectives. These collectives include traditional
state institutions, such as the judiciary or governmental agencies,
but they also include other collectives such as the family. As
Fineman explains, “[i]n complex modern societies no one is selfsufficient, either economically or socially. Whether the subsidies we
receive are financial . . . or nonmonetary . . . we all live subsidized
lives.”82 Since individuals already live a subsidized life, the role of
the state is to empower those institutions to be responsive to
individuals’ vulnerabilities. Only by supporting institutions that
foster growth of the assets responsive to pre-existing vulnerabilities
can the state help subjects overcome disadvantages.
This vision of the state’s role is notably different from the
present conservative framework. Currently, focusing on equal
outcomes without considering pre-existing vulnerabilities ignores
how equal treatment does not result in equal outcomes. For
John O. Calmore, A Call to Context: The Professional Challenges of Cause Lawyering at
the Intersection of Race, Space, and Poverty, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1927, 1953 (1999)
(internal citations omitted).
76 See, e.g., Daniela Kraiem, Consumer Direction in Medicaid Long Term
Care: Autonomy, Commodification of Family Labor, and Community Resilience, 19 AM.
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 671, 717 (2011) (“Support of groups that encourage social
interaction . . . create the kind of social support that enables people to go on living
independently for as long as possible.”); Gavin Smith et al., Assessing State Policy
Linking Disaster Recovery, Smart Growth, and Resilience in Vermont Following
Tropical Storm Irene, 15 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 66, 76 (2013) (discussing the role of group
participation in building resiliency).
77 Kuo & Means, supra note 25, at 97.
78 See Daniel P. Aldrich, Fixing Recovery: Social Capital in Post-Crisis
Resilience, J. HOMELAND SECURITY 6 (2010).
79 See Fineman, Anchoring Equality, supra note 22, at 8.
80 See id. at n.42.
81 See id. at 10.
82 FINEMAN, MYTH, supra note 42, at 50.
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example, Professor Fenton uses healthcare to illustrate the
difference between the current neoliberal perspective and a
vulnerability analysis.83 Traditional equality concerns might look
narrowly at the availability of healthcare resources: so long as
individuals have equal access to those resources, the neoliberal
position concludes there is no need for a more responsive state.84
Thus, in the current paradigm there is “[a] certain reluctance (if
not hostility)” toward adopting structured resiliency tools.85
In contrast, a vulnerability analysis of the same healthcare
inquiry begins by considering “the ability of differently situated
groups in society to actually access them.”86 Rephrased, a
vulnerability analysis considers the underlying vulnerabilities in
the population seeking healthcare that hinder access. If
vulnerabilities are present, equal access is insufficient—assuming
universal healthcare is the goal.87 Considering pre-existing
vulnerabilities may elicit alternative justifications for a more
responsive state.
II.

THE CLASS ACTION BACKLASH THROUGH A
VULNERABILITY LENS

With a foundation on vulnerability analysis in place, this
Part details class actions’ larger social justice goals that protect
and empower individuals. It then explains how false cries of
needing to “equalize” class actions eclipsed these goals. Finally, it
discusses the current judicial reluctance to permit class actions.
A.

The Mixed Goals of the 1966 Amendment to Rule 23

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 sets forth the
prerequisites for class certification.88 The current class action
requirements come from Rule 23’s 1966 Amendment,89 which
eliminated the earlier “true, hybrid, and spurious” class
categories under the original 1938 version.90 These vague
See Fenton, supra note 38, at 131-32.
See id.
85 See Coyle, supra note 33, at 64.
86 Fenton, supra note 38, at 132 (emphasis omitted).
87 Id. (“Without genuine equality of opportunity and access, the least vulnerable
in society (who are best placed to access healthcare) are further privileged.”).
88 FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
89 Charles A. Wright, Class Actions, 47 F.R.D. 169, 170 (1970). Though class
actions were permitted under the prior 1938 version of the rule, the actual procedures
for certification were nebulous at best. Hence, the true birth of class actions is more
attributable to the 1966 amendment. Klonoff, supra note 11, at 738.
90 Klonoff, supra note 11, at 736 (internal quotations omitted).
83
84
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classifications hindered the growth of class actions since they
“baffled both courts and commentators.”91 Conversely, the 1966
Amendment provided more functional categories, such as
injunctive or damages classes, as well as some broad-brush
requirements for satisfying this certification.92
However, the 1966 Amendment was not a wholesale
adoption of private enforcement. The Amendment was akin to
what vulnerability analysis recognizes as a momentary willingness
to address the disadvantaged.93 As with other state responses, the
institutional assistance offered by Rule 23 was narrow, limiting its
full potential. While the Amendment expanded earlier class action
rules, it created several vague hurdles to private enforcement.94
Congress drafted the statute without fully defining key terms. For
example, one requirement for certification is “numerosity,” but the
statute is silent as to how numerous class members must be.95
While the Amendment encouraged greater use of Rule
23,96 the purpose for this expansion was less clear from legislative
history.97 Scholars and critics quickly began proffering justifications
for the Amendment and its resulting expansion.98 Generally,
these justifications fall into two categories, creating a divide that
shaped the future of class action debates: (1) regulatory potential—
which recognized quasi-vulnerability concerns, and (2) judicial
efficiency—which threatened to neuter class actions’ utility for
actual legal and social change.
On the regulatory side, the Amendment reflected, in part,
the then-current skepticism of the market99—and accompanying
skepticism of the government’s ability (or willingness) to regulate
companies.100 Because individuals only suffer minimal monetary
Wright, supra note 89, at 176 (internal quotations omitted).
FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
93 Cf. Fineman, Anchoring Equality, supra note 22, at 2 (discussing moments
of state responsiveness).
94 STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN
CLASS ACTION 278 (1987).
95 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
96 Wright, supra note 89, at 170.
97 YEAZELL, supra note 94, at 238-39.
98 See id. As Professor Yeazall, a leading class action historian, explains:
“Predicated on the failure of market capitalism and pledged to remedy its defects through
legal actions, [the 1996 Amendment] represented both a rejection and an embrace of the
invisible hand as a social mechanism.” Id. at 244. Consumer protection concerns were also
coupled with environmental and racial discrimination concerns. Id. To some, it is these
combined concerns that stimulated stronger class action procedures in the 1960s. Id.
99 The Amendment also was a response to racial politics and interests in
advancing civil rights. See id. at 243 (discussing the history of the 1966 Amendment).
100 MICHAEL PERTSCHUK, REVOLT AGAINST REGULATION: THE RISE AND PAUSE
OF THE CONSUMER MOVEMENT 11 (1982); WALTER A. ROSENBAUM, THE POLITICS OF
91

92
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damages in business tort class actions, they often lack financial
motivation and resources to undertake lengthy, expensive
litigation against well-funded defendants.101 By aggregating
consumers’ claims, the Amendment provided a mechanism to
equalize opportunities and allow individuals to take full
advantage of the judicial system.102 Thus, the expansion of Rule
23 encouraged individuals to “supplement regulatory agencies
both by requiring wrongdoers to give up their ill-gotten gains and
by ferreting out instances of wrong that might have escaped the
regulators’ observance.”103
To others, the Amendment was more about procedural
fairness and efficiency. The Amendment was merely a mechanism
to allow individuals with similar claims to bring suit collectively,
thereby minimizing the judicial resources needed to evaluate those
claims.104 These critics also raised autonomy concerns, particularly
about how class actions may require individuals to pursue claims
they otherwise might not.105 Hence, critics in this camp believe
class action mechanisms should be narrowly cast without concern
for regulatory impact.106 Otherwise, such procedural rules would
violate the Rules Enabling Act, which limits the judiciary’s ability
to expand substantive law remedies.107
ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERN 65-66 (1973); JAMES Q. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF
REGULATION 357-97 (1980).
101 See, e.g., Chieftain Royalty Co. v. QEP Energy Co., 281 F.R.D. 499, 506
(W.D. Okla. 2012); Campbell v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 253 F.R.D. 586, 605
(E.D. Cal. 2008), adhered to, 287 F.R.D. 615 (E.D. Cal. 2012).
102 In re Serzone Prods. Liab. Litig., 231 F.R.D. 221, 240 (S.D.W. Va. 2005) (“A
class action significantly reduces the overall cost of complex litigation, allowing
plaintiffs’ attorneys to pool their resources and requiring defendants to litigate all
potential claims at once, thereby leveling the playing field between the two sides.”); In
re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 842 (E.D.N.Y.1984), aff’d, 818
F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987); see also William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of
Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371, 433 (2001) (“Class actions can reduce disparities in
bargaining power between plaintiffs and defendants.”).
103 YEAZELL, supra note 94, at 232.
104 See id.
105 See Jay Tidmarsh, Living in CAFA’s World, 32 REV. LITIG. 691, 719 (2013)
(“Pushed to its limit, respect for individual autonomy requires the abolition of all class
actions other than opt-in arrangements in which class members voluntarily join together.”).
106 See David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm
Und Drang, 1953-1980, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 587, 594 (2013).
107 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012). Professor Martin Redish’s work exemplifies
Rules Enabling Act arguments in the class action context. See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH,
WHOLESALE JUSTICE ch. 3 (2009); Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic
Difficulty: Rethinking the Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 71, 82 (2003) (“[O]ne might be tempted to conclude that, as presently
structured, Rule 23 violates the separation of powers protections of the United States
Constitution, or at the very least the statutory directive of the Rules Enabling Act that
a procedural rule may not abridge, enlarge, or modify a substantive right.”); Martin H.
Redish & Nathan D. Larsen, Class Actions, Litigant Autonomy, and the Foundations of
Procedural Due Process, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1596 (2007).
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Uncertainty about how to fulfill Rule 23 requirements and
the purpose for encouraging more class actions left the courts to
answer these nebulous questions.108 The future of class actions,
post-1966, depended on which of these goals the judiciary
adopted.109 The first goal would allow the judicial system to
empower individuals by giving them a key resiliency procedural
mechanism.110 The second goal would give corporate defendants
room to minimize Rule 23 so as to avoid large-scale exposure.111
Judicial response to these goals is the focus of the next section.
B.

The Growth of Anti-Class Action Rhetoric

Because of the uncertainty surrounding the 1966
Amendment, courts were initially hesitant to follow the
Congressional nudge towards permitting class actions.112 It was
not until the 1980s that courts began regularly certifying putative
claims.113 Rather than focusing on issues of judicial access or
social justice, courts highlighted class actions’ potential efficiency:
class action mechanisms were preferable to “repeating, hundreds
of times over, the litigation of [the same factual issues].”114
This justification allowed courts to overlook class actions’
larger potential but still creatively experiment with them—
something corporate defendants and their allies115 greatly feared
given the potential for class actions to “rearrang[e] the economic
landscape.”116 To successfully undermine the expansion intended
YEAZELL, supra note 94, at 278.
See Marcus, supra note 106, at 622 (discussing the divide over how to
interpret the purpose of Rule 23).
110 Cf. Id. at 623 (“The regulatory conception’s chief value of regulatory
efficacy is straightforward. Courts should deploy Rule 23 to maximize the substantive
law’s purchase, so as to compensate for inadequacies of public administration.”).
111 See id. at 621.
112 Klonoff, supra note 11, at 736; see, e.g., In re N.D. Cal., Dalkon Shield IUD
Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Fed. Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d
1175 (8th Cir. 1982) (denying class certification of claims stemming from collapsed
skywalks at a Kansas City hotel).
113 See Marcus, supra note 106, at 648-51 (discussing the late 1970s and the
early 1980s as a period of stability, whereby courts and corporate litigants had decided
they “could live with class action litigation”).
114 Klonoff, supra note 11, at 737 (quoting Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc.,
782 F.2d 468, 473 (5th Cir. 1986)).
115 Anti-class action criticism often follows party lines. As Professor Mullenix
explains, “not surprisingly, the critics of expansive and innovative use of the class
action rule (especially when applied to resolve mass tort and small claims damage class
actions) included corporate defendants, the Chamber of Commerce of the United
States, like-minded lobbying groups, and most Republicans.” Linda S. Mullenix,
Aggregate Litigation and the Death of Democratic Dispute Resolution, 107 NW. U. L.
REV. 511, 523 n.54 (2013).
116 YEAZELL, supra note 94, at 264.
108

109
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by the 1966 Amendment, critics had to negate regulatory and
efficiency justifications for class actions.
This section details the derailing of both justifications
for the 1966 Amendment through the rise of the blackmail
myth and cost-benefit arguments, and judicial adoption of
these arguments. By debunking the primary justifications for
more expansive class actions, reformists succeeded in
emasculating federal class actions just as they were poised to
truly counteract corporate power. This success is a prime
example of what Professor Grear accurately describes as
“capitalism’s uncanny ability to continuously, adaptively, and
reflexively adopt the guise and languages of its putative
critiques and counter-values.”117
1. Buying Into the Blackmail Myth
First, early class action criticism was fueled by judicial
and academic voices that refocused class action dialogue away
from its regulatory potential. Professor Milton Handler’s
commentary exemplifies this:
Any device which is workable only because it utilizes the threat of
unmanageable and expensive litigation to compel settlement is not a
rule of procedure—it is a form of legalized blackmail. If defendants
who maintain their innocence have no practical alternative but to
settle, they have been de facto deprived of their constitutional right
to a trial on the merits. The distinctions between innocent and guilty
defendants and between those whose violations have worked great
injury and those who have done little if any harm become blurred, if
not invisible. The only significant issue becomes the size of the
ransom to be paid for total peace. Furthermore, while the judicial
system is less encumbered than it would be if such an action were
litigated, the imposition on judicial time is nevertheless
substantial.118

Handler’s scholarship helped redirect the class action
debate away from victimized class members.119 His critique
Grear, supra note 46, at 54 (discussing the power of global capital).
Milton Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in
Antitrust Suits—the Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1971).
119 By the 1970s he was already a leading antitrust scholar and considered a
centrist. See Sylvia Nasar, Milton Handler, 95, Is Dead; Antitrust Expert Wrote Laws,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/11/12/business/milton-handler95-is-dead-antitrust-expert-wrote-laws.html (“On antitrust matters, Professor Handler’s
philosophy was distinctively centrist.”); see also Milton Handler, Recent Antitrust
Developments, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 159, 188 (1963) (discussing his centrist views). Thus, his
criticism was viewed as tempered, though it failed to consider the consequences to plaintiffs
and larger enforcement goals. In fact, he later lamented the lack of government regulation—
something these private class actions could have supplemented. Milton Handler, Foreword,
117

118
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created the foundation for the current neoliberal framework’s
abandonment of “vulnerability as a moral issue” in favor of a
focus on marketplace principles.120 By creating a crisis, namely
this alleged “legalized blackmail,” critics could begin pushing
for reform.
Though it took over a decade, critics advancing this procorporate sentiment found an ally in Judge Posner.121 Echoing
much of Handler’s sentiment, the Seventh Circuit, in an opinion
drafted by Posner, built on the blackmail myth to conceptualize
corporate defendants as vulnerable parties in need of judicial
protection.122 In re Rhone-Poulenc123 involved a putative class
action claim against manufacturers of certain blood products.124
The plaintiffs were hemophiliacs who contracted HIV from
defendants’ tainted products.125 Though there was significant
evidence that blood transfusions spread HIV, the defendants
forewent blood testing, pointing to cost and reduced supply
concerns.126 The defendants also allegedly failed to warn the
plaintiffs of the danger of contracting AIDS from the products127—
leaving this vulnerable group further disadvantaged.
The trial court granted class treatment for a portion of
the claims.128 However, with significant judicial or evidentiary
support, Posner decertified the class because of concerns about
the potential harm certification could cause the defendants.129
75 CAL. L. REV. 787 (1987) (“It is only in the [Reagan] administration, however, that a policy
of nonenforcement has set in, much to the distress of those who believe that without
antitrust the free market cannot long remain free.”).
120 Grear, supra note 46, at 66.
121 Judge Posner was not the only judicial voice to raise allege blackmail
concerns. As early as 1972, Judge Henry Friendly, the revered Second Circuit jurist,
raised concerns about class actions forcing defendants into “blackmail settlements.” See
HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 120 (1973); see also
Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1357, 1430 (2003).
122 See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995).
123 Id. at 1293.
124 See Wadleigh v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 410, 413 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
125 See id. at 414. For a detailed discussion of the facts in the underlying case, see
Jeff Wright, Note, Bad Blood: Wadleigh v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., Mandamus
Uncabined, 23 W. ST. U. L. REV. 549, 550-52 (1996) (discussing in detail the background of
the Wadleigh case); see also Jeff Lyon, A Matter of Life or Death, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 23, 1989),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1989-04-23/features/8904060794_1_blood-last-year-factordonor (discussing the history of hemophiliacs with HIV and the effects on hemophiliacs of
recent price increases of hemophilia medication).
126 Kathryn Glasgow Lotfi, Suppliers of AIDS-Contaminated Blood Now Face
Liability, 34 HOW. L.J. 183, 187-88 (1991); see also James K. Lehman, Blood Suppliers’
Liability for AIDS Contaminated Blood, 41 S.C. L. REV. 107, 109 n.14 (1989).
127 See Wadleigh, 157 F.R.D. at 410.
128 See id. at 415-18.
129 See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1304 (7th Cir. 1995).
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Posner rationalized decertifying the class because of “the sheer
magnitude of the risk to which the class action, in contrast to
the individual actions pending or likely, expose[d] [defendants
to] . . . intense pressure to settle.”130
In essence, Posner’s argument mirrored Handler’s
earlier critique, but in the context of In re Rhone-Poulenc, its
merit was particularly questionable. Blood manufacturers
already successfully defended similar claims by relying on
“blood shield statutes.”131 Further, the defendants previously
evaded liability since the blood industry was slow to test blood—
allowing defendants to raise standard of care arguments.132
Hence, these defendants were hardly defenseless against class
actions. Rather, Posner sympathized with the corporate giants,
leaving the HIV hemophiliac putative class members with no
reasonable avenue for legal recourse.133
Judge Posner’s remarks spread like wildfire, and the
blackmail myth soon dominated class action rhetoric.134
Branded as extortionists, plaintiffs’ attorneys became the focus
of class action criticism for placing defendants “under intense
pressure to settle.”135 This narrative became the rally cry for
sweeping judicial activism.
However, in a thorough debunking of the blackmail myth,
Professors Kanner and Nagy point out that settlement rates for
class actions are directly on par with settlements in other types of
federal actions.136 There is no evidence that class actions create
Id. at 1297-98.
See Kathryn W. Pieplow, AIDS, Blood Banks and the Courts: The Legal
Response to Transfusion-Acquired Disease, 38 S.D. L. REV. 609, 622-23 (1983).
132 See Laurie C. Uustal, In the Matter of Rhone-Poulenc Rorer; Shielding
Defendants Under Rule 23, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1247, 1258-59 (1997).
133 While there had already been a series of individual suits against the defendants,
the cost and stigma concerns made individual litigation unlikely. See In re Rhone-Poulenc, 51
F.3d at 1303 (“The plaintiffs argue that an equally important purpose of the class certification
is to overcome the shyness or shame that many people feel at acknowledging that they have
AIDS or are HIV-positive even when the source of infection is not a stigmatized act. That, the
plaintiffs tell us, is why so few HIV-positive hemophiliacs have sued.”).
134 This is not to say all class actions have merit. Few, if any, societal institutions
are free from isolated instances of abuse. This has also been true in class actions’ fifty year
history in federal courts. For class action, initial rumbles against this form of aggregate
litigation occurred in response to early coupon settlements, where class members did not
receive direct monetary compensation but instead received coupons off future purchases.
Rather than recognizing the potential deterrent and non-compensatory attributes
associated with such settlements, the focus instead turned to the class action plaintiffs’
attorneys who receive compensation under fee shifting provisions.
135 See In re Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1298; see also Newton v. Merrill Lynch,
Piece, Fenner, & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154 (3rd Cir. 2001) (using “hydraulic pressure”
to define class actions’ alleged pressure to settle put upon defendants, when they want
to avoid “potentially ruinous liability”).
136 Kanner & Nagy, supra note 12, at 697.
130

131
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any unique pressure. Perhaps the more intriguing question is
how this narrative continued to dominate despite empirical
evidence undermining its accuracy. Given its lack of merit, the
blackmail myth becomes an example of what some scholars might
characterize as the rise of falsely generated crises to justify less
government responsiveness during the neoliberal period.137
This fear of class actions successfully minimized plaintiffs’
ability to participate in the judicial system.138 The blackmail myth
allowed courts to protect corporations and falsely equalize the
playing field in class actions.139 A primary justification for class
actions—increased regulatory impact—went to the wayside,
replaced with concerns about well-funded corporate defendants
unjustly paying for corporate malfeasance.
2. The Rise of Cost-Benefit Analyses . . . and the Fall of
Private Enforcement
Next, with regulatory justifications minimized, critics
turned to undermining the alternative justification for the 1966
expansion of class actions—judicial efficiency. As the blackmail
myth grew in popularity, cost-benefit arguments started
redefining efficiency justifications.
Interestingly, early law and economic analyses of class
actions, such as those advanced by Professor Dam, supported
the 1966 Amendment’s expansion. While these arguments did
not consider policy or larger social goals, they recognized that
class actions reduced transaction costs. Further, class actions
resulted in deterrence gains.140 Thus, initial law and economic
analyses of class actions aligned with the regulatory justification
for the 1966 Amendment.
However, these supportive critiques were soon eclipsed
by reframed efficiency arguments. New cost-benefit arguments
137 See, e.g., NAOMI KLEIN, THE SHOCK DOCTRINE: THE RISE OF DISASTER
CAPITALISM 8-11, 15, 16 (2007) (discussing this false crisis generation as “the shock
doctrine”); see also BARRY BUZAN ET AL., SECURITY: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
17 (1998) (describing “securitization” as the creation of a scapegoat to generate fear
and disorient the public).
138 Cf. Grear, supra note 46, at 60 (explaining vulnerability analysis as a means of
minimizing “the usual corporate financial dominance over ‘participatory’ processes”).
139 See Silver, supra note 121, at 1358 (discussing how “‘[h]ydraulic
pressure . . . to settle’ is now a recognized objection to class certification” that is
repeatedly asserted by defendants).
140 Kenneth W. Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and
Conflict of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 47 (1975); see also Edward Brunet, Improving Class
Action Efficiency by Expanded Use of Parens Patriae Suits and Intervention, 74 TUL. L. REV.
1919, 1939 (2000) (describing competing law and economic class action arguments).
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advanced autonomy concerns.141 To critics, benefits of class
actions do not outweigh potential harm.142 While class actions
may deter wrongdoing, critics contend this benefit is insufficient
to justify the potential harm to corporations and increased costs
for consumers from defending against such claims.143 Instead,
“[w]e should rely on individual litigation to secure financial
compensation for individuals’ financial losses, accepting that
some losses that were wrongfully imposed by others will go
uncompensated because they are simply too small to be worth
the cost of individual litigation.”144 A rational individual would
forego class action rights145 and wait for administrative agencies
and attorneys general to achieve the goals currently addressed
by class actions.146
Like the blackmail myth, cost-benefit and rational actor
arguments ignore the consequences of attacking class actions.
If accepted, these arguments exclude aggregation for small and
large individual sum cases. Low individual sum cases—the
cases originally intended for class aggregation—fail costbenefit/efficiency analyses because of the small amounts at
issue compared to the expense of suit.147 Large individual sum
cases, in contrast, fail such analyses “because individuals could
cost-effectively achieve just compensation through more traditional
legal outlets.”148 Thus, by relying on autonomy and cost-benefit
arguments, neoliberal arguments essentially immunize corporate
defendants from class action claims.
Despite these points, efficiency arguments quickly took
root in judicial opinion. Without a true vision of what costs and

141 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class
Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1465 (1995) (questioning the utility of class actions
because of the cost spent litigating the claims).
142 See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the
Class Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 35 (2000)
(discussing class action criticisms).
143 See id.
144 DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC
GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 471 (Rand Institute for Civil Justice ed. 2000) [hereinafter
RAND REPORT], available at www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR969.
145 See, e.g., Silver, supra note 121, at 1361-62 (citing Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacqueline, 391 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1968) to demonstrate facts of a case with claims too
small to litigate); cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit,
Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 382 (2000)
(discussing apathy arising from small stakes claims).
146 Patrick A. Luff, Bad Bargains: The Mistake of Allowing Cost-Benefit
Analyses in Class Action Certification Decisions, 41 U. MEM. L. REV. 65, 68 (2010).
147 See, e.g., Legge v. Nextel Commc’ns, Inc., No. CV 02-8676, 2004 WL
5235587, at *13-17 (C.D. Cal. June 25, 2004).
148 See, e.g., Luff, supra note 146, at 73.
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benefits should be analyzed,149 courts started using cost-benefit
arguments to justify class certification denials.150 Class actions
were deemed no longer efficient, gutting even the second,
narrower rationale for the 1966 expansion.
Once regulatory and efficiency justifications for expanding
class actions were negated, it was not long before courts and
Congress began chipping away at class actions—taking back one
of the few resiliency tools for plaintiffs in large business tort
claims. Decisions denying certification began incorporating the
blackmail myth and inefficiency concerns.151 The Fifth Circuit,
once supportive of class actions,152 decertified the largest class
action to date, a 50 million-person nationwide class of nicotine
addicts.153 The Sixth Circuit and Third Circuit quickly followed
suit, decertifying other important putative class claims.154 But
the full class action backlash was still yet to come.
C.

The Current Impotency of Rule 23

The outcry for class action reform continued into the early
2000s, when the blackmail myth eventually drove Congress and
the judiciary to undertake changes to class action mechanisms.
These changes were meant to protect defendants, stripping the
advantages intended by Rule 23. The largest change adopted
under the guise of equalizing class actions was the 2005 Class
Action Fairness Act (CAFA). Though Congress originally labeled
the Act the “Consumer Class Action Bill of Rights,”155 the Act did
not aim to help consumers but rather solve “the problem of
unfair settlements and excessive attorneys’ fees.”156 Hence,

149 See id. at 69 (“The cost-benefit analyses employed by courts lack any
semblance of uniformity and are frequently premised on under-informed conclusions.”).
150 See, e.g., London v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 340 F.3d 1246, 1255 n.5 (11th
Cir. 2003) (denying certification and noting that “defendants’ potential liability would
be enormous and completely out of proportion to any harm suffered by the plaintiff[s]”).
151 See, e.g., Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154,
168 n.8 (3d Cir. 2001); Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1996).
152 See Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 473 (5th Cir. 1986) (“[T]he
defendants enjoy all of the advantages, and the plaintiffs incur the disadvantages, of the
class action—with one exception: the cases are to be brought to trial.”).
153 Castano, 84 F.3d at 752.
154 See, e.g., In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069 (6th Cir. 1996); In re Gen.
Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995);
see also Mullenix, supra note 115, at 524.
155 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 3, 119 Stat. 4, 5-9
(to be codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1711-15).
156 JUDICIARY COMM. REPORT ON CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT, S. REP. NO.
109-14, at 27 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 26, 27.
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CAFA was Congress’ adoption of and response to the blackmail
myth and efficiency and autonomy concerns.157
In addition to discouraging class actions by limiting
attorneys’ fees, CAFA expanded federal diversity jurisdiction to
force state class claims back into federal court.158 The removal
of class actions from state court was predicated as a measure
essential to “equalize” the treatment of defendants in pending
state and federal class actions, as state courts were perceived
as more sensitive to local plaintiffs. However, once again,
empirical evidence did not support this alleged need to protect
corporate defendants.159
The expansion of federal jurisdiction has had very real
consequences for class action plaintiffs. As Professor Rice
explains:
[C]orporate defendants are substantially more likely to win tortbased class actions when those claims are litigated in federal courts
of appeals. And corporate defendants won large percentages of tortbased, federal class actions regardless of whether class members
sued multinational corporations and insurers jointly or individually.
Corporate defendants “win” ratios in federal courts are 66.7% and
84.6%, respectively.160

157 See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. S1245 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Dodd) (“[C]urrent pleading practice by the class action plaintiffs bar has very
effectively denied Federal jurisdiction over cases that are predominantly interstate in
nature. These are precisely the kinds of cases the Framers thought deserve to be heard
in Federal courts. . . . [This Act only brings] pleading practice more into line with
constitutional requirements. Cases that are primarily intra-rather than interstate in
nature may continue to be heard in State courts. But . . . clearly interstate [cases] will
now be more likely to be heard in Federal court, where they belong.”).
158 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2005). Plaintiffs’ class action attorneys sought refuge
in state courts. Unlike their federal brethren, state court judges demonstrated a clearer
willingness to allow class actions. Mullenix, supra note 115, at 525-26. These state court
successes only fueled anti-class action sentiment and gave critics new cause to
reinvigorate arguments centered on protecting alleged corporate wrongdoers. The
reinvigorated arguments found a sympathetic environment in the current pro-corporate
neoliberal environment.
159 See Class Action “Judicial Hellholes”: Empirical Evidence Is Lacking, PUB.
CITIZEN’S CONG. WATCH (Jan. 2005), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/
OutlierReport.pdf (reporting that very few jurisdictions are “unfair” to defendants and
that various states have altered their class action rules for defendants’ benefit); cf.
Thomas E. Willging & Shannon R. Wheatman, Attorney Choice of Forum in Class
Action Litigation: What Difference Does It Make?, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 591, 645,
652-54 (2006) (finding, on limited data, no differences in treatment of class actions
between state and federal courts, and observing that “[a]ttorney perceptions of judicial
predispositions toward their clients’ interests show little or no relationship to the
judicial rulings in the surveyed [state and federal class action] cases”). But see Klonoff,
supra note 11, at 732 (discussing how state-court jurisdictions “were not sympathetic to
large, out-of-state defendants”).
160 Rice, supra note 2, at 541.
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Thus, while CAFA was enacted to promote fairness, in
actuality it has helped corporations evade class action liability.
With multistate class actions now funneled into federal
court,161 federal judicial activism continues to chip away at class
action procedures. The Roberts Court’s pro-corporate record is
well-established. After just five terms, the Roberts Court ruled
for business interests 61% of the time.162 This is in contrast to
46% in the last five years of the Rehnquist Court and 42% of all
Courts since 1953.163 The Court’s corporate protection has
greatly limited class actions.164 The Roberts Court has actively
heightened procedural requirements, making it harder to get
into court; harder to plead a business tort class claim; and
harder to certify a federal class.165
Now, the dominant judicial attitude towards class actions
is knee-jerk skepticism. At the inception of any class action,
scales already tip heavily in the defendant’s favor. Putative class
members’ very attempt to pursue class claims places them in a
suspect posture for judges. In fact, the tenor in some class
certification decisions assumes the claims are of questionable
merit from the outset. As one court recently stated, “denying or
granting class certification is often the defining moment in class
actions (for it may . . . create unwarranted pressure to settle
nonmeritorious claims on the part of defendants) . . . .”166
Even assuming corporate defendants need more
protection, the Supreme Court has added substantial gatekeeping
161 See Klonoff, supra note 11, at 745 (“CAFA has in fact had an enormous
impact in shifting most class actions to federal court.”); see also Gail E. Lees et al., Year
in Review on Class Actions, 13 CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. (BNA) No. 4, at 225 (Feb. 24,
2012) (noting—indeed, exclaiming—that, following CAFA’s enactment, “consumer class
action filings increased by 577% in the district courts in the Ninth Circuit!”).
162 Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Is the Roberts Court
Pro-Business? 1-2 (Dec. 17, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), www.scribd.com/doc/
50720643/EPSTEIN-LANDES-POSNER-Is-the-Roberts-Court-Pro-Business.
163 See id.
164 See, e.g., George Rutherglen, Wal-Mart, AT&T Mobility, and the Decline of
the Deterrent Class Action, 98 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 24, 25 (2012) (discussing the
Supreme Court’s trend to rule against expanding class action mechanisms).
165 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Pleading Problem in Antitrust Cases and
Beyond, 95 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 55, 56-58 (2010). This is in addition to narrowing the
substantive claims often brought as private class actions. For example, the Roberts Court
eroded per se liability for key potential antitrust violations. See, e.g., Leegin Creative
Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (overruling the long-standing
doctrine of per se illegality in holding that resale price maintenance is to be judged by the
rule of reason); Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006) (finding joint venture agreement
to sell gasoline at the same price to their separate chains of branded service station
owners was not per se illegal as a horizontal price fixing agreement).
166 Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 165
(3d Cir. 2001).
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to class actions during the last decade alone.167 One of the primary
new gates to business tort class claims is Bell Atlantic
Corporation v. Twombly, which altered the pleading standard for
a complaint.168 In Twombly, the Supreme Court returned to
blackmail and efficiency rationales to justify empowering judges
to dismiss class claims they deem implausible based on their
“judicial experience and common sense.”169 The Supreme Court’s
tenor demonstrates a clear disdain for class actions, framing them
as potentially asserting “a largely groundless claim . . . tak[ing] up
the time of a number of other people, with the right to do so
representing an in terrorem increment of the settlement value.”170
This skepticism and new pleading standard means class plaintiffs
must now prove their case without the aid of discovery.171
For many areas of law, this standard means little. For
example, in a typical contract case, a plaintiff need only allege
facts for each element of the claim, with potentially more
emphasis on breach and damages allegations. So long as a
party states facts “plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent
with)” illegal conduct,172 the complaint should stand.
But in antitrust and consumer fraud claims, what is
“plausible” is far more relative. Twombly permits a judge to
subjectively decide whether she believes wrongdoing is
plausible in a given industry.173 This subjectivity is notably
deadly for putative antitrust class actions. Two out of every
three antitrust claims filed since Twombly have been dismissed
167 Lazaroff, supra note 13. For a thorough discussion of increased
gatekeeping under the Roberts Court, see generally Wasserman, supra note 14.
168 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
169 Id. at 565.
170 Id. at 558 (internal quotations omitted). Soon after, the Supreme Court
confirmed that this new pleading standard applied to all cases, not just antitrust class
actions. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-80 (2009) (applying the Twombly
standard to a qualified immunity claim). However, the revised pleading standard
disproportionately impacts consumer class actions, particularly antitrust claims. See,
e.g. Edward D. Cavanagh, Twombly: The Demise of Notice Pleading, the Triumph of
Milton Handler, and the Uncertain Future of Private Antitrust Enforcement, 28 REV.
LITIG. 1, 17-27 (2008) (discussing impact of Twombly).
171 Cavanagh, supra note 170, at 22.
172 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.
173 Further, this requirement ignores that defendants, not plaintiffs, have
access to detail needed to pass this barrier. See also Hovenkamp, supra note 165, at 58
(discussing the problematic nature of Twombly for plaintiffs attempting to plead
implicit market division agreements). As one scholar explains, “Based on differences
among judges, one judge may dismiss a complaint while another concludes that it
survives, solely because of the way each judge applies his or her ‘judicial experience
and common sense.’ This is bound to create unpredictability, lack of uniformity, and
confusion.” Suzette M. Malveaux, Clearing Civil Procedural Hurdles in the Quest of
Justice, 37 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 621, 624 (2011).
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on Rule 12(b)(6) motions,174 a figure nearly 25% higher than in
torts or contracts cases.175 Thus, even assuming class actions
needed more gatekeeping—a suspect assumption—Twombly
more than sufficed.
Nonetheless, Twombly is far from the only obstacle to
realizing class actions’ potential. In American Express Co. v. Italian
Colors Restaurant,176 the Court provided potential defendants with
a powerful tool to avoid class actions altogether.177 A potential
defendant need only include an arbitration clause that precludes
class actions to avoid such suits.178 By inserting the correct magic
language in the fine print of a product’s terms and conditions, a
potential defendant can immunize itself from class actions.179
This decision reflects another autonomy-based justification
for narrowing class actions: freedom of contracts—even if that
freedom is illusory to the average consumer. Freedom to contract
focuses on the capabilities of autonomous legal actors, while
concurrently failing to recognize the power differential between
corporations and consumers. To the Court’s majority, class actions
wrongly interfere with that freedom and thus need curtailing. As
Justice Kagan accurately describes the decision: “The Court
today mistakes what this case is about. To a hammer, everything
looks like a nail. And to a Court bent on diminishing the
usefulness of Rule 23, everything looks like a class action, ready
to be dismantled.”180
These procedural changes significantly restricted the
viability of class actions. As Senator Arlen Spector noted:
174 Heather Lamberg Kafele & Mario M. Meeks, Developing Trends and
Patterns in Federal Antitrust Cases after Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Aschroft
v. Iqbal, SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP ANTITRUST DIG., Apr. 2010, at 8. A segment of
scholars, practitioners, and advocacy organizations have sought to ameliorate the harm
caused by this decision, though their proposed responses are far from uniform. Some
advocate for limited discovery, others seek a legislative override of the decision or
amendments to the Federal Rules. See Malveaux, supra note 173, at 629; see also
Letter from Albert A. Foer, President, The Am. Antitrust Inst., to Hon. Lee H.
Rosenthal, Chair, The Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the
Judicial Conference of the United States (May 27, 2010) (endorsing “flashlight
discovery,” that is, limited initial discovery).
175 Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter
Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 607 (2010).
176 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
177 As one commentator describes the decision: “This is as big a pro-business, procorporate ruling as we’ve ever seen from the Roberts’ Court—and it will take explicit
Congressional action to overturn it.” Andrew Cohen, No Class: The Supreme Court’s
Arbitration Ruling, ATLANTIC (Apr. 27, 2011, 5:33 AM), http:// www.theatlantic.com/
national/archive/ 2011/04/no-class-the-supreme-courts-arbitration-ruling/237967.
178 Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2309-10.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 2320 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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The effect of the Court’s actions will no doubt be to deny many
plaintiffs with meritorious claims access to the federal courts and,
with it, any legal redress for their injuries . . . . I think that is an
especially unwelcome development at a time when, with the
litigating resources of our executive-branch and administrative
agencies stretched thin, the enforcement of federal antitrust,
consumer protection, civil rights and other laws that benefit the
public will fall increasingly to private litigants.181

The true perniciousness of these changes, however, is
their alleged intent to make class actions fairer. Since class
actions equalize judicial access and consumers’ regulatory
power, restricting Rule 23 does not create fairness or social
justice. It instead returns consumers to their original posture—
namely one of disadvantage against large corporate defendants.
The next part explores consumers’ pre-existing disadvantages in
vulnerability terms.
III.

CLASS ACTIONS THROUGH A VULNERABILITY LENS

The current anti-class action sentiment is a classic
example of what vulnerability analysis describes as the neoliberal
agenda. Rule 23, read literally, is party-neutral but as presently
applied benefits the already advantaged. In terms of vulnerability,
the dialogue over class actions fails to consider the pre-existing
imbalances created by social and economic disparities between
plaintiffs and defendants. In simple terms, courts are not looking
at the bigger picture. Larger questions of social justice are
ignored, as class action reform focuses myopically on formal
efficiency and corporate protection.
Rather than focusing solely on how corporate defendants
fare once a claim is certified, a vulnerability analysis offers a
broader, more comprehensive vision. It starts by diagnosing
vulnerabilities then evaluates whether the state is sufficiently
responsive to these needs. Prior vulnerability scholarship has yet to
discuss class action mechanisms. This part fills that gap. It starts
by examining corporate defendants’ posture, explaining why some
of the supposed disadvantages perceived by the courts are more
mythical than real. Then, it juxtaposes these advantages against
class action plaintiffs’ oft overlooked disadvantages.

181 Specter Proposes Return to Prior Pleading Standard, BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES
(July 23, 2009, 11:43 AM), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2009/07/specter-proposesreturn-to-prior-pleading-standard.html (internal quotation marks omitted).

770

A.

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:3

Mythical Corporate Disadvantages

To start, this Article acknowledges corporations, as with
small businesses or other entities, have the potential to
experience vulnerabilities.182 When a corporation commits
wrongdoing, that wrongdoing is done by individuals. For example,
in a consumer case, specific individuals are responsible for failing
to disclose information; or, in an antitrust case, individuals create
an overly restrictive distribution policy. But vulnerability from
one’s status as an individual is limited by the corporate structure.
As a corporation, these defendants do not face meaningful
individual financial liability. Further, corporations are
advantaged by the rise of procedural gatekeeping in class
actions—making it easier for a case to avoid merit based
determinations.183 As a result, judicial advocacy to limit class
actions is not warranted.
While class actions often involve high stakes claims,
defendants in these cases are also uniquely well-situated to
weather this risk. Corporate defendants often have deep enough
pockets and maybe more significantly, can rely on both primary
and secondary insurance to shield themselves from class action
losses.184 The corporate structure immunizes individuals from
accountability. Because individuals’ actions take place under a
corporate shield, it is rare for individuals to be charged with
corporate misconduct.185 If misconduct is uncovered, the
corporation—not the individual wrongdoers—pays the potential
consequences.186 While criminal punishment for business class
action torts is possible, individual jail time is still a rarity.187 And
Fineman, Anchoring Equality, supra note 22, at 12.
See Arthur R. Miller, Mcintyre in Context: A Very Personal Perspective, 63 S.C. L.
REV. 465, 476 (2012) (discussing how increased procedural gatekeeping benefits defendants).
184 See Silver, supra note 121, at 1414.
185 Abigail H. Lipman, Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 359,
360 (2009); Matambanadzo, supra note 49, at 471 (“Because prosecutors are hesitant to
punish ‘innocent’ shareholders for corporate wrongdoing, only a small number of criminal
cases proceed against corporate defendants.”).
186 Matambanadzo, supra note 49, at 470 (“The corporation enjoys a separate
legal existence from its shareholders, directors, and officers. This separate legal
existence provides limited liability for the human persons behind the corporation, even
though their decisions and preferences control the actions of the corporate person.”).
187 See, e.g., Ben Hallman, Too Big to Jail: Wall Street Executives Unlikely to Face
Criminal
Charges,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Sept.
8,
2012,
2:42
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/08/criminal-charges-wall-street_n_1857926.html
(discussing how few corporate defendants will face jail time for their role in the subprime
mortgage debacles); Eric Tucker, Jail Time for Toyota Executives is Unlikely,
TWINCITIES.COM (Mar. 25, 2014, 12:01 AM), http://www.twincities.com/ci_25419498/jailtime-toyota-executives-is-unlikely (discussing how despite persuasive efforts to conceal the
extent of dangerous car defendants, it is unlikely Toyota executives will face jail time).
182

183
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if a corporate actor must pay an individual fine, corporations often
provide compensation.188 Such pay is often offset by insurance,
thus further minimizing financial disadvantage.
Beyond financial advantage, corporate defendants also
have procedural advantages in class actions. Growth of
procedural limitations brings more protection for corporate
defendants from class action exposure. As procedural hurdles rise,
courts increasingly move away from merit-based determinations.
Corporate defendants can avoid potential class action exposure by
prohibiting class actions in the terms and conditions for their
products.189 If a claim manages to survive this hurdle, the odds for
dismissal on a motion to dismiss are in defendants’ favor. Even in
the class action setting, corporate defendants have the power of
dispositive motions.190 Such motions are particularly powerful
post-Twombly. Prior to the heightened pleading requirements
articulated in Twombly, at least one-third of class actions were
already resolved on purely dispositive motions.191 Since Twombly,
there has been a notable increase in motions to dismiss192—
without corresponding evidence that the quality of complaints is
somehow on the decline. A complaint is one-and-a-half times more
likely to be dismissed now than before Twombly: three out of ten
complaints are now tossed out.193
Courts also continue to restrict Rule 23, making it less
likely a corporate defendant will have to face a certified class.
The extensive requirements of Rule 23 already provided a
procedural framework embedded with mechanisms favoring
defendants. This is even more true for Rule 23(b)(3) classes, which
permit monetary damages. For such claims, class counsel must
prove numerosity, typicality, adequacy, predominance, and
superiority.194 While historically, some courts permitted use of
188 JOHN M. CONNOR, GLOBAL PRICE FIXING 419-20 (2001) (describing how
during cross-examination at the famous 1998 trial of three top executives of ADM for
price fixing, the lead (immunized) witness for the prosecution was made to admit that
his employer had paid his entire fine and promoted him to president of one of its
largest subsidiaries).
189 See supra Part II.C. and accompanying notes (detailing new procedural
hurdles in class actions).
190 Kanner & Nagy, supra note 12, at 694.
191 See THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS ACTIONS IN
FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
CIVIL RULES 29-32 (1996) (citing figures and noting that, although appeals courts
disagree on the appropriateness of ruling on dispositive motions prior to certification,
district judges routinely do so).
192 See Hatamyar, supra note 175, at 622-23 (analyzing dismissal rates pre
and post-Twombly).
193 See id.
194 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
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presumptions to establish some of the requirements for class
certification, with the attack on class actions came an erosion
of those presumptions as well.195 Even assuming a legitimate
need to narrow class actions, there has been an overcorrection
without sufficient justification.
More significantly, perhaps, is the Supreme Court’s recent
heightening of the commonality requirement. Prior to 2011,
commonality was relatively easy to satisfy so long as “there [was]
‘at least one issue whose resolution will affect all or a significant
number of putative class members.’”196 In Wal-Mart v. Dukes,197
however, the Supreme Court heightened the requirement. Class
members must now establish they share the same injury, not just
one common issue.198 This heightened commonality requirement
makes class certification harder and has already resulted in
certification denials199—which limit claims defendants face by
denying plaintiffs’ judicial access.200 Accordingly, the standards for
class certifications are more arduous than a decade ago, even
without the other procedural hurdles such claims now face.
Nonetheless, judicial protection of corporations increases with
each new procedural hurdle for class actions. Members of the
Senate Judiciary Committee have noted how the Rehnquist and
Roberts Courts have systematically gutted substantive laws
aimed at protecting consumers, “sometimes turning these laws on
their heads and making them protections for big business rather
than for ordinary citizens.”201
195 See Christine Bartholomew, Death by Daubert: The Continued Attack on
Private Antitrust, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 2147, 2182 (2014) (discussing presumptions
impacting class certification determinations); see, e.g., In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge
Antitrust Litig., 287 F.R.D. 1, 41 (D.D.C. 2012) (alternating presumption of impact to
something more akin to a presumption-plus, meaning some additional evidence is needed
for common impact).
196 Forbush v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 994 F.2d 1101, 1106 (5th Cir. 1993); cf.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2).
197 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
198 Id. at 2551.
199 See, e.g., Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Schs., 668 F.3d 481, 493, 497-98 (7th
Cir. 2012) (finding that class plaintiffs failed to establish commonality under the Dukes
standard in an action alleging the failure to ensure children’s rights under the
Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act); Haggart v. Endogastric Solutions, Inc.,
No. 10-346, 2012 WL 2513494, at *4 n.5 (W.D. Pa. June 28, 2012) (“While it appears that
there could certainly be common issues resolvable in a way that would move the litigation
forward . . . and/or common questions of law, it also appears that class members have not
suffered the same class of injury and that commonality would therefore not be met under
Dukes.” (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted)).
200 See A. Benjamin Spencer, Class Actions, Heightened Commonality, and
Declining Access to Justice, 93 B.U. L. REV. 441, 448 (2013).
201 Short-Change for Consumers and Short-Shrift for Congress? The Supreme
Court’s Treatment of Laws that Protect Americans’ Health, Safety, Jobs and Retirement:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 1 (2008) [hereinafter Short-
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Given the procedural benefits afforded corporate
defendants, the notion that settlements are extorted is suspect
from the outset. More fundamentally, though, characterizing class
actions as blackmail is a flawed justification for evading social
justice for four distinct reasons. First, it ignores that settlement
pressure exists for all cases. Second, framing settlements as
“blackmail” assumes settlements are unjustified pay outs—hardly
a neutral premise. Settlements in these cases may instead be
redress or disgorgement. Third, corporate defendants can offset
any perceived threat brought on by litigation by maximizing the
available class action procedures. Such procedural gatekeeping
limits potential claims needing resolution—be it through merit
based determinations or settlement.
Finally, and perhaps most telling, the premise that
corporate defendants are victims of meritless class actions lacks
support. For example, the Committee on the Judiciary study of
class actions analyzed allegations of meritless claims leading to
forced settlements and found such concerns were unfounded,
given procedural mechanisms offset any illusory concerns of
coercive settlement.202 The bipartisan Antitrust Modernization
Commission reached a similar result in its study of private
antitrust class actions.203 During its investigation, the
Commission sought testimony and evidence to assess the need for
additional gatekeeping.204 It concluded: “No actual cases or
evidence of systematic over-deterrence were presented to the
Commission . . . .”205 Such conclusions raise significant
questions about characterizing class action settlements as
extortion. Rather, they suggest such settlements are just the
natural by-product of litigation more generally.
Hence, to frame class actions as only disadvantaging
corporate defendants by extorting settlements is overly simplistic.
Once the parties’ relative positions are considered, it becomes
evident that putative plaintiffs are the true systematically
disadvantaged. The next section begins that juxtaposition.

Change] (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary),
available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_senate_
hearings&docid=f:44331.pdf.; see also Simon Lazarus, Hertz or Avis? Progressives’
Quest to Reclaim the Constitution and the Courts, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1201, 1249 (2011).
202 See JUDICIARY COMM. REPORT ON CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT, supra note
156, at 94-95.
203 See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
247 (2007).
204 See id.
205 See id.
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Class Action Plaintiffs as the Disadvantaged

While corporate defendants face limited financial
disadvantages—most of which can be offset through procedural
advantages—class action plaintiffs’ disadvantages are significant.
These disadvantages exist across a putative class and are
independent of class members’ identity in terms of traditional
markers, such as age or race. Corporate wrongdoing often impacts
large numbers of individuals.206 As has long been recognized,
“[m]odern society seems increasingly to expose men to such group
injuries for which individually they are in a poor position to seek
legal redress, either because they do not know enough or because
such redress is disproportionately expensive.”207 Though hardly a
comprehensive list, putative class members asserting business
tort claims are disadvantaged financially, informationally, and
because of judicial favoritism.
1. Consumers’ Financial Disadvantage Vulnerability
From purely a financial viewpoint, the disparity between
class action plaintiffs and defendants is marked. Such cases are
notably expensive, as they often implicate complex, protracted
legal questions.208 Individual litigation expenses easily exceed any
potential recoupment.209 This is particularly true when the harm
consumers suffer from wrongdoing is minimal—even if the
aggregate harm the corporate defendant has caused is extensive.
As detailed above, individual plaintiffs face significant
financial vulnerabilities that stand in stark relief to the more
limited financial constraints of corporate actors. Few class
members have the funds to undertake years-long litigation.
These class members are dependent on plaintiffs’ lawyers to
front the money for such claims, often to the sum of many
206 As the Ontario Law Reform Commission noted in justifying class actions,
the activities of major corporations in “mass manufacturing, mass production, and
mass conception” can affect and harm large groups of individuals. 1 ONTARIO LAW
REFORM COMM’N, REPORT ON CLASS ACTIONS 3, § 56 (1982).
207 Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the
Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L REV. 684, 686 (1941).
208 See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae, The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, in
Support of the Petitioner at *3, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 1973 WL 172434 (U.S.
2004) (“Antitrust litigation, almost by definition, is complex, protracted, and costly.”).
209 Radha Geismann, M.D., P.C. v. Allscripts Healthcare Solutions, Inc., 764 F.
Supp. 2d 957, 961 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (discussing how “[l]itigating class actions is expensive”);
Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility Assoc. of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Financial
Arrangements in Class Actions, and the Code of Professional Responsibility, 20 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 831, 832 (1993) (“[C]lass actions can be extremely expensive to carry to the
point where recovery of costs can be realized from a settlement fund or judgment.”).
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millions of dollars.210 As the Supreme Court once noted: “A class
action solves [the problem]” that “small recoveries do not
provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action
prosecuting his or her rights” by “aggregating the relatively
paltry potential recoveries into something worth someone’s
(usually an attorney’s) labor.”211
The facts in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion212 highlight
how consumers’ financial vulnerability limits redress against
alleged corporate wrongdoing. The facts of the case are
relatively straightforward: AT&T offered consumers a free
phone for signing a two-year contract. Subsequently, AT&T
charged consumers money for their “free” phone.213 The amount
of individual harm suffered varied, but the Concepcions, the
named plaintiffs in the class, were charged $30.22.214 The
Concepcions brought a putative class claim, alleging in part,
AT&T engaged in false advertising and fraud by charging sales
tax on phones it advertised as free.215 Rather than allowing all
similarly aggrieved consumers to proceed as a class, the
Supreme Court instead enforced AT&T’s arbitration clause
which prohibited class actions.216
This decision just exacerbates consumers’ financial
vulnerability. Because consumers lack equal bargaining power,
they have limited ability to avoid such arbitration provisions in
the first place.217 Additionally, consumers can no longer rely on
plaintiffs’ attorneys to front the money to bring suit. As Justice
Breyer’s dissent explains, “The maximum gain to a customer
210 See, e.g., Edward F. Sherman, Consumer Class Actions: Who Are the Real
Winners?, 56 ME. L. REV. 223, 230 (2004) (“There is no doubt that class actions have
been fueled by entrepreneurial incentives for plaintiffs’ lawyers.”).
211 Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617-18 (1997) (internal
citations omitted).
212 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
213 Id. at 1744.
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 Id. (“The contract provided for arbitration of all disputes between the
parties, but required that claims be brought in the parties’ individual capacity, and not
as a plaintiff or class member in any purported class or representative proceeding.”
(internal citation omitted)).
217 This point is more thoroughly explained in Justice Kagan’s dissent in Am.
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). This case expands the holding
of Concepcion to federal claims. In dissenting, Justice Kagan states: “In the hands of
today’s majority, arbitration threatens to become more nearly the opposite—a mechanism
easily made to block the vindication of meritorious federal claims and insulate
wrongdoers from liability.” Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304,
2320 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting). For a full discussion of both decisions, see
generally Recent Case, American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 127 HARV.
L. REV. 278, 283 (2013).
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for the hassle of arbitrating a $30.22 dispute is still just
$30.22 . . . . What rational lawyer would have signed on to
represent the Concepcions in litigation for the possibility of fees
stemming from a $30.22 claim?”218
Hence, because of the rise of the blackmail myth and the
corresponding retraction of class action mechanisms,
consumers’ financial vulnerability is increased. Without
attorneys to advance fees and costs, the financial disparity
leaves consumers with no realistic means of seeking judicial
relief for corporate malfeasance.219
This financial disadvantage is only worsened by the
current wealth disparity in the United States.220 The top 1% of
households own close to 60% of corporate wealth.221 This is in
contrast to the bottom half of the population, owning just 2% of
American wealth.222 As corporate wealth increases, so does the
gap between the very rich and the rest of the population.223 This
is compounded by government tax subsidies to corporations
eclipsing social welfare spending.224 This growing gap between
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1760-61 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004)
(“The ‘realistic’ alternative to a class action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero
individual suits, as only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.”); Brief for Sixteen Law
Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 17, Proskauer Rose LLP v. Troice,
Nos. 12-79, 12-86 and 12-88 (U.S. July 24, 2013) [hereinafter Brief of Sixteen Law
Professors] (“Denial of class relief under both federal and state law as a matter of statutory
interpretation would mean no relief at all.”).
220 THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 257 (Arthur
Goldhammer trans., 2014).
221 See David Cay Johnston, Corporate Wealth Share Rises for Top-Income
Americans, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/29/national/
29rich.html.
222 PIKETTY, supra note 220, at 257 (detailing the wealth disparity globally
and in the United States).
223 See id.
224 Corporations receive $100 billion a year in business subsidies. See Tad
DeHaven, Corporate Welfare in the Federal Budget, CATO INST. POL’Y ANALYSIS, July 25,
2012, at 2, available at http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/PA703.pdf. This
figure is close to double the social welfare benefits provided by the government. See
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2013 BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT,
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2013/assets/
budget.pdf; see also Mike P. Sinn, Government Spends More on Corporate Welfare
Subsidies than Social Welfare Programs, THINK BY NUMBERS (Mar. 6, 2011, 9:03 PM),
http://thinkbynumbers.org/government-spending/corporate-welfare/corporate-welfarestatistics-vs-social-welfare-statistics/. Because corporate subsidies come from taxes,
consumers are unwittingly funding this widening gap. Though critics disagree on the
precise figure, the average American family pays between $1000 to $6000 in corporate
welfare subsidies. Compare Paul Buchheit, Add It Up: The Average American Family
Pays $6,000 a Year in Subsidies to Big Business, COMMON DREAMS (Sept. 23, 2013),
https://www.commondreams.org/view/2013/09/23, with Scott Lincicome, Calculating the
Real Cost of Corporate Welfare, THE FEDERALIST (Sept. 30, 2013), http://thefederalist.com/
2013/09/30/calculating-the-real-cost-of-corporate-welfare/.
218

219
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corporate and individual wealth has notable consequences to
consumers’ vulnerability to corporate wrongdoing. A corporation’s
primary goal is to produce profits, regardless of social cost.225 This
“amoral maximization of profits” is further challenged in times of
financial instability, including the United States’ current
financial crisis.226 As Thomas Piketty explains, “In my view there
is absolutely no doubt that the increase inequality in the United
States contributed to the nation’s financial instability.”227 This
financial instability incentivizes corporate wrongdoing—
wrongdoing that appears to be on the rise since the recent
economic downturn.228
Consumers are the common victim of such misconduct:
they pay the price of companies’ decisions to take short-cuts for
product safety issues or engage in anticompetitive behavior.
Thus, consumers’ financial vulnerability is likely to only
increase in the face of future exposure to corporate misconduct.
As Judge McDade explains, without aggregation, consumers are
unlikely to seek redress because of financial barriers: “Given the
relatively small amount recoverable by each potential litigant, it
is unlikely that, absent the class action mechanism, any one
individual would pursue his claim, or even be able to retain an
attorney willing to bring the action.”229 The exceptional expense
and time associated with pursuing complex litigation creates
barriers few individuals choose to overcome—even if they can.230
Stated bluntly, “the individual is very often unable or unwilling
to stand alone in meaningful opposition.”231

225 See JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF
PROFIT AND POWER 60-84 (2004).
226 See PIKETTY, supra note 220, at 297.
227 Id.
228 Anecdotal evidence suggests the current economic downturn has resulted in
increased corporate misconduct. See, e.g., The Rot Spreads: Corporate Crime is on the
Rise, ECONOMIST (Nov. 9, 2009), http://www.economist.com/node/14931615 (discussing
results of PricewaterhouseCoopers survey showing, “[t]he recession has taken its toll on
morals as well as profits”).
229 Shaver v. Trauner, No. 97-1309, 1998 WL 35333713, at *8 (C.D. Ill. July 31,
1998) (citing Lake v. First Nationwide Bank, 156 F.R.D. 615, 628, 629 (E.D. Pa. 1994)).
230 See, e.g., Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 338-39
(1980) (observing that class actions make it possible to bring claims that otherwise would
not be economically possible); Eisen v. Carlisle, 417 U.S. 156, 161 (1974) (noting that
without class action, “[n]o competent attorney would undertake [petitioner’s] action to
recover so inconsequential an amount”).
231 REPORT ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 206.
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2. Consumers’ Information Inequity
Even beyond financial disparity, potential plaintiffs are
disadvantaged by information disparity between the parties.
Business tort class actions often involve covert wrongdoing,
making it difficult for individuals to know they were victims.
Without this knowledge, individuals cannot evaluate their role
in responding to this harm. Instead, putative class members
unwittingly provide monetary rewards for corporate wrongdoing.
Private antitrust class actions provide a quintessential example.
Antitrust class actions are replete with allegations of secretive
arrangements.232 Few defendants are forthcoming about pricefixing. Thus, consumers continue purchasing price-fixed products,
helping to generate corporate profits.
Even for those business torts where individuals are aware
of being wronged, class members are still informationally
disadvantaged. Corporations have successfully adopted furtive
corporate practices that hinder justice by making investigation
difficult. Such practices include silent recalls and secret
warranties—which minimize individuals’ ability to assess how
widespread a problem is or the extent of defendants’ knowledge.233
Individual consumers are reliant on the rare corporate
whistleblower to leak information or a lucky consumer advocacy
group able to compile consumer complaints.234 Thus, relief from
wrongdoing is inconsistent, at best.
General Motors’ (GM) recent defective ignition switch
debacle illustrates consumers’ information vulnerabilities. In
2002, GM knowingly elected to use an ignition switch that fell far
below its own specification requirements.235 Early in production,
GM engineers learned the switch’s problems could cause a car to
continue running even after turned off.236 In fact, GM engineers
internally called the part “the switch from hell.”237 Despite
232 See, e.g., Emerson Elec. Co. v. Le Carbone Lorraine, S.A., 500 F. Supp. 2d
437, 449 (D.N.J. 2007); In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., No. Misc. 99-197, 2000 WL
1475705 (D.D.C. May 9, 2000), clarified on denial of reconsideration sub nom. In re
Vitamins Antitrust Litig., No. Misc. 99-197, 2000 WL 34230081 (D.D.C. July 28, 2000);
Abernathy v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 97 F.R.D. 470, 472 (N.D. Tex. 1983).
233 Jeff Sovern, Good Will Adjustment Games: An Economic and Legal
Analysis of Secret Warranty Regulation, 60 MO. L. REV. 323, 329 (1995).
234 See id. at 326.
235 ANTON R. VALUKAS, REPORT TO BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF GENERAL MOTORS
COMPANY REGARDING IGNITION SWITCH RECALLS 1 (May 19, 2014) [hereinafter
VALUKAS REPORT], available at http://www.beasleyallen.com/webfiles/valukas-reporton-gm-redacted.pdf.
236 See id.
237 Id. at 5.
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customer complaints and lawsuits, GM did not act to recall cars
with the faulty switch until 2014—12 years later.238
This is not just a case of negligence. Rather, at the
orchestration of its legal department, GM undertook action to
minimize the spread of information about the safety problem.
Employees were discouraged from note-taking at meetings.239 GM
officials downplayed its knowledge of the problem in interviews
with the press.240 Efforts to investigate the switch were hindered by
a GM official’s decision to bury information about modifications of
the switch by concealing the part’s identification number.241
Because of this covert action, consumers were deprived key
information necessary to unearth the extent of the harm they
suffered from purchasing GM cars with this switch.242
Other barriers to information are judicially sanctioned. For
example, after Concepcion and Italian Colors, a corporation can
wholly avoid class actions and force non-class binding arbitration
through contractual terms and conditions.243 In addition to raising
questions about the viability of the unconscionability doctrine and
adhesion contract arguments, forced arbitration further limits
consumers’ information. It is difficult for individuals to learn of
other pending arbitration claims,244 especially for arbitrations
subject to confidentiality provisions.245
In cases where individuals can overcome these initial
disadvantages, informational disparities continue to hinder
judicial recourse in other ways. Defendants often hold all the
information necessary to prove the substantive claim and certify
the class but have the experience and savvy to complicate or, at a

See id. at 1-2.
See, e.g., Bill Vlasic, G.M. Lawyers Hid Fatal Flaw, From Critics and One
Another, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/07/business/gmlawyers-hid-fatal-flaw-from-critics-and-one-another.html.
240 VALUKAS REPORT, supra note 235, at 7.
241 See id. at 9-10.
242 Now that more extensive information of GM’s wrongdoing is publicly available,
plaintiffs in one previously settled individual lawsuit against GM seek to reopen the
litigation. See Georgia Lawsuit Still Causing Trouble for GM, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (July
1, 2014, 8:20 PM), http://www.dallasnews.com/business/headlines/20140701-georgialawsuit-still-causing-trouble-for-gm.ece. Moreover, several putative class members have
brought class action complaints for suffered economic damage through loss of resale value.
See, e.g., Andrews v. General Motors LLC, No. 5:14-cv-1239 (C.D. Cal. filed June 18, 2014).
These putative class claims are still in their infancy.
243 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); AT&T
Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
244 Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2316 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (discussing the
dangers of arbitration confidential provisions).
245 See, e.g., id.; Marci A. Eisenstein, Enforcing Arbitration Clauses in
Consumer Class Actions: An Uncertain Future, BRIEF, Summer 2006, at 30, 33.
238
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minimum, frustrate the production of such information.246
Plaintiffs must fight lengthy discovery battles to learn the scope of
the wrongdoing and quantum of monetary harm suffered.
Information disadvantages further inhibit plaintiffs’
ability to fulfill the ever-heightening requirements for class
certification. For example, to prove numerosity under Rule
23(a), class counsel must offer evidence of the class size.247 Or
in a consumer law case, class members may have to establish
defendants’ knowledge of wrongdoing.248 Such evidence is often
solely in the defendants’ possession.249
For those cases that survive certification and are resolved
via settlement or trial, individuals may still remain informationdeprived. For example, in damages cases under Rule 23(b)(3),
courts focus primarily on compensatory damages, ignoring other
harm such as moral injury.250 But, as Judge Tamora explains,
“cost-benefit analysis [means] balancing human lives and limbs
against corporate profits.”251 Mere compensatory damages are
sometimes insufficient to deter wrongdoing252 and can deny class
members alternative remedies which could foster class actions’
potential as a public good.253
246 See, e.g., Algee v. Nordstrom, Inc., No. C 11-301 CW, 2012 WL 1575314 (N.D.
Cal. May 3, 2012), motion for relief from judgment denied, No. C 11-301 CW, 2012 WL
1919134 (N.D. Cal. May 25, 2012) (discussing the need for discovery in a class action when
defendant is sole possessor of evidence); James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class
Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 497, 521 (1997) (“[Evidence of wrongdoing in securities
cases] is generally in the possession of the defendant corporation so that the lack of
discovery in such cases seriously impedes the initiation of such suits.”).
247 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
248 See, e.g., Tait v. BSH Home Appliances Corp., 289 F.R.D. 466, 478 (C.D. Cal.
2012), perm. app. denied, Cobb v. BSH Home Appliances Corp., No. 13-80000, 2013 WL
1395690 (9th Cir. Apr. 1, 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1273 (2014); cf. Peoples v. Wendover
Funding, Inc., 179 F.R.D. 492, 496 (D. Md. 1998) (discussing how defendant’s knowledge of
alleged wrongdoing precluded defense in a Fair Debt Collection Act class claim).
249 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d
228, 237 (2d Cir. 1974); CE Design v. Beaty Const., Inc., No. 07 C 3340, 2009 WL
192481, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 26, 2009); cf. State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp.,
80 F.R.D. 142, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
250 Moral injury considers the harm class members suffer from learning of
defendants’ failure to conform to moral standards. See, e.g., Animal Legal Def. Fund v.
Mendes, 160 Cal. App. 4th 136, 147 (2008) (“moral injury” resulting from defendants’
alleged violation of anticruelty laws in raising calves could not support UCL action
because plaintiffs did not purchase dairy products that were of inferior quality). For a
thorough discussion of moral injury and how it differs from compensatory damages, see
Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39
UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1671 (1992).
251 Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 812 (1981).
252 See, e.g., David G. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability
Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1258, 1323-24 (1976); Note, Class Actions for Punitive
Damages, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1787, 1816 (1983).
253 See, e.g., Class Actions for Punitive Damages, supra note 252 (arguing for
punitive damages in class actions to ensure full deterrence).
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Hence, information deficiencies exacerbate consumers’
vulnerability. Consumers’ ability to fully assess the harm they
suffered is correspondingly compromised. This hinders consumers
in their attempt to recover for corporate wrongdoing.
3. Judicial Favoritism, the Rise of Procedural Hurdles,
and the Harm to Consumers
Consumers are disadvantaged by the rise of procedural
hurdles that allow defendants to avoid legal accountability. A
corporation can “win” either by beating a motion for class
certification or by winning a dispositive motion without
necessarily reaching the substantive allegations of misconduct.
As previously detailed, in federal court, where these
claims are primarily brought, it is now harder to get into court;
harder to plead a claim; and harder to certify a class.254 With each
new procedural advantage afforded to defendants, the scales of
justice continue to tip in defendants’ favor. This, in turn, leaves
consumers further disadvantaged from equal access to justice.
Nonetheless, post-CAFA, courts still rely on the blackmail myth
to justify additional class action restrictions.255 As it stands,
consumers can only proceed to trial if they win each of six
procedural hurdles corporate defendants may raise: (1) a motion
to dismiss; (2) pre-certification Daubert motions, challenging
plaintiffs’ expert testimony’s admissibility; (3) class certification;
(4) an expert challenge pre-summary judgment; (5) summary
judgment; and (6) a renewed Daubert challenge pre-trial.256 While
courts have yet to fully consider the cumulative effect of these
changes, the procedural disadvantages consumers face are
significant
given,
individually, such hurdles already
disproportionately impact plaintiffs.
Through a distorted definition of who needs judicial
protection, class action claims, particularly for business torts,
See Hovenkamp, supra note 165, at 56-58.
See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 80
(2006) (“Even weak cases brought under [Rule 10b-5] may have substantial settlement
value . . . because [t]he very pendency of the lawsuit may frustrate or delay normal business
activity.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Malack v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 617 F.3d 743,
755 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[C]lass certification puts pressure on defendants to settle claims, even if
they are frivolous.”); In re Constar Int’l Sec. Litig., 585 F.3d 774, 780 (3d Cir. 2009)
(explaining that class certification is an “especially serious decision”); In re Hydrogen
Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 310 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[C]lass certification may force a
defendant to settle rather than incur the costs of defending a class action and run the risk of
potentially ruinous liability.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
256 Cavanagh, supra note 15, at 119; see also Bartholomew, supra note 195,
at 2185-86.
254

255
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have gone from the equivalent of a slingshot to a handful of
pebbles in an individual’s arsenal. As Judge Weinstein explains:
The class action as a device to equalize the litigation power of the
many with small monetary, discrimination and other claims against
powerful institutions—government and private—was an exciting
American development of the last third of the twentieth century. It
is now being strangled and neutered, largely because it was too
effective in providing remedies against malefactors who would
otherwise escape the law.257

In sum, not only are individuals disadvantaged
economically, due to a lack of information, the judicial system
continues deepening individuals’ vulnerability to corporate
wrongdoing. With each procedural advantage afforded corporate
defendants, it is more likely individuals’ claims will go
unredressed. This inequity is problematic since class actions
provide key resiliency assets, as explored in the next part.
IV.

ADVANCING RESILIENCY UNDER RULE 23

Understanding the pre-existing disadvantaged state of
individual plaintiffs provides a new starting point for class
action debates. Vulnerability theory’s primary tenet is that a
responsive state is obligated to remediate disadvantages by
advancing opportunities for connection and interdependence.258
Class action mechanisms provide such opportunities. A
putative class is analogous to other political collectives, such as
unions, whose group action can provide resilience against
market-generated vulnerabilities.259 Consumers, like individual
employees, have little realistic avenue to voice grievances
against corporate misconduct. Both may lack the motivation,
information, or political wherewithal necessary to undertake
257 Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of Judges in a Government Of, By, and For the
People: Notes for the Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 114 (2008).
258 Fineman, Equality, supra note 32, at 26 (“Vulnerability’s values would be
more egalitarian and collective in nature, preferring connection and interdependence
rather than autonomy and independence in both political and personal visions.”); see
also Fineman, supra note 43, at 300 (“This means that as the subject of policy and
politics, the vulnerable subject cannot merely be left to his autonomy, liberty, and
independence, but should be cushioned by a responsive state.”).
259 Cf. Marion Crain, Strategies for Union Relevancy in a Post-Industrial World:
Reconceiving Antidiscrimination Rights as Collective Rights, 57 LABOR L. J. (2006),
available at 2006 WL 7123709 (“Unions are able to capitalize on legislative rights achieved
through political voice, bringing group actions alleging violations of ‘individual’ rights
protected by employment legislation as a prelude to organizing campaigns.”). Consequently,
some of the same efficiency and autonomy attacks on class actions have also been brought
against unions. See, e.g., Laurie Serafino, Life Cycles of American Legal History Through
Bob Dylan’s Eyes, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1431, 1441 (2011).
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action that would lead to a collective best outcome, but collective
forms help remedy this problem.260 While neoliberalism
emphasizes individual action, the default in a vulnerability
analysis is that “individuals bolster their resilience by joining
together to address vulnerabilities generated by the market.”261
This viewpoint reflects a more interdependent view of individuals
and collectives, understanding that individual interests must be
supported and structured over time through institutions that
allow individuals to act collectively.
As a starting point, class actions are a way for the
responsive state to provide a societal institution—the judicial
system—that cushions consumers against misfortune, namely
misfortune resulting from business torts.262 Class actions provide
a type of social capital,263 whereby an individual’s vulnerability is
mediated by working with a group “to accomplish greater things
than they could by their isolated efforts.”264 Through class actions,
consumers gain resilience from strength in numbers to combat
“the defining characteristic of the modern citizen: alienation.”265
However, the benefits from this form of collective action
extend beyond social assets. This Part explains how
incentivizing—rather than limiting—class actions provides
260 See, e.g., Louise Sadowsky Brock, Note, Overcoming Collective Action
Problems: Enforcement of Worker Rights, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 781, 786 (1997)
(discussing the barriers to employees bringing individual lawsuits to obtain a collective
good); see generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 12 (1971) (arguing individuals will not act to further
group interests with coercion or other incentives).
261 Cf. Fineman, Equality, supra note 32, at 23.
262 See id. at 22.
263 By making this point, I do not mean to wade into the existing controversies
regarding social capital. Compare Yuko Nakagawa & Rajib Shaw, Social Capital: A
Missing Link to Disaster Recovery, 22 INT’L J. MASS EMERGENCIES & DISASTERS 5, 9
(2004) (discussing how social capital for its “over-versatility”), with JON ELSTER,
EXPLAINING SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: MORE NUTS AND BOLTS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 456
(2007) (describing social capital as “useless and harmless”). For a further discussion of
the divide over the utility of social capital see generally Kuo & Means, supra note 25,
at 99-100 (discussing how the social capital has not been universally accepted). Rather,
I use the term just as an alternative way to characterize the resilience value of class
actions. See, e.g., Fineman, Equality, supra note 32, at 23 (defining social assets as the
“networks of relationships from which we gain support and strength”).
264 Kuo & Means, supra note 25, at 97-98 (internal quotations omitted)
(discussing value of social capital for effective disaster response); Katie Melnick, In
Defense of the Class Action Lawsuit: An Examination of the Implicit Advantages and a
Response to Common Criticisms, 22 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 755, 788 (2008)
(“Similarly the class action device gives plaintiffs a sort of strength in numbers
mentality. Alone, facing the big businesses of the world can be daunting; and yet, as
one in a group of injured plaintiffs, this daunting task becomes more feasible.”); cf.
Deborah R. Hensler & Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Beyond “It Just Ain’t Worth It”:
Alternative Strategies for Damage Class Action Reform, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
137, 137 (2001) (discussing social benefits of class actions).
265 Coyle, supra note 33, at 69.
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consumers benefits. First, class actions increase opportunities for
consumer participation in the judicial system. Second, by bringing
consumer class actions, individuals have the ability to avoid
future business tort harm through class actions’ deterrent
effect. Third, class actions are a way the state can permit
consumers an alternative form of market influence. Each of
these benefits produce resiliency assets responsive to the
consumer vulnerabilities identified in Part III. Recognizing and
rewarding these resiliency gains can help redefine prey and
predator in terms of the true disadvantaged party in these
cases: the putative class member.266
A.

Overcoming Vulnerability through Participation Options

To begin, a class action is a “powerful and versatile tool”
for ensuring consumers access to justice267: a class action can
move the judicial system closer to allowing every injured party his
day in court.268 Class actions guarantee corporations are not
beyond the reach of the long arm of the law by allowing
consumers to pursue claims that would likely otherwise go
unlitigated.269 Specifically, class actions increase judicial
participation by giving consumers tools to overcome financial and
informational vulnerabilities and minimize judicial favoritism.
First, class action mechanisms provide class members
much needed financial resources. Consumers have the right to
sue for corporate wrongdoing; however, that right is illusory given
the expense of individual litigation.270 Through claim aggregation
procedures, the state provides consumers a way to “accumulate
resources,” which in turn helps overcome the disparity between
266 See, e.g., David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual
Justice by Collective Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561, 586-93 (1987) (discussing how the
economic benefits of class action suits outweigh fairness concerns, especially when the
concern for individual autonomy threatens the economic feasibility of pursuing a class
action in the first place).
267 Anne Bloom, From Justice to Global Peace: A (Brief) Genealogy of the Class
Action Crisis, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 719, 719 (2006); Darren Carter, Notice and Protection of
Class Members’ Interests, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1121, 1121 (1996).
268 See Melnick, supra note 264, at 788; see also Lee W. Rawles, The California
Vexatious Litigant Statue: A Viable Tool to Deny the Clever Obstructionists Access?, 72
S. CAL. L. REV. 275, 275 (1998) (“It is axiomatic in our system of justice that every
person is entitled to his day in court.”).
269 See, e.g., Christopher R. Leslie, The Significance of Silence: Collective
Action Problems and Class Action Settlements, 59 FLA. L. REV. 71, 745-75 (2007)
(suggesting that businesses, knowing individuals are unlikely to bring suit “may
knowingly engage in illegal conduct that causes dispersed injury, confident that it will
not be held accountable”).
270 See supra Part II.A-C.
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consumers and corporations.271 Class counsel advances fees and
costs, which are recouped only if the case settles or there is a final
determination in class members’ favor.272 Further, by pooling
their resources, plaintiffs have the added resiliency gain of
retaining more qualified lawyers.273 These resiliency gains “level[ ]
the playing field” between consumers and corporate defendants,274
allowing consumers to hold large corporations accountable even in
situations where individual harm is low yet the aggregate harm is
significant.275 In fact, “the policy at the very core of the class
action mechanism” is to help overcome financial hurdles that
limit judicial access.276
Second, consumers also gain resiliency against information
vulnerability by participating in class actions. The fee-shifting
dimension of class actions incentivizes attorneys to identify and
investigate corporate wrongdoing.277 Filing of these claims leads
Fineman, Equality, supra note 32, at 22.
Class counsel commonly advances the costs of class-action litigation. See,
e.g., Sylvia R. Lazos, Abuse in Plaintiff Class Action Settlements: The Need for A
Guardian During Pretrial Settlement Negotiations, 84 MICH. L. REV. 308, 314 n.35
(1985) (“As in contingent fee contracts, the class attorney will most likely recover a full
fee only if the class suit is successful. Thus, the attorney, not the class, absorbs the full
cost of defeat in class action suits.”); see also 5 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG,
NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 15:21 (4th ed. 2002) (stating that cost advancements on
a contingency basis are critical in class actions); Jay Tidmarsh, Rethinking Adequacy of
Representation, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1171 (2009) (discussing how counsel generally
advance fees in class actions).
273 See Richard C. Ausness, Retribution and Deterrence: The Role of Punitive
Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 KY. L.J. 1, 102 (1985)
274 Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 141-44 (1974); Benjamin Sachs-Michaels,
The Demise of Class Actions Will Not Be Televised, 12 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 665,
671 (2011) (“Although there has been extensive academic debate over class action
lawsuits for many years, even detractors of the device would admit that it can be used
successfully to level the playing field between aggrieved individuals and powerful
corporations.”). Some argue that this very power, and its corresponding potential for
recourse, makes class actions a target for reform. See Melnick, supra note 264, at 790-91.
275 Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too Little?, 158 U. PA. L.
REV. 2043, 2083 (2010) [hereinafter Fitzpatrick, Lawyers]; Note, Locating Investment
Asymmetries and Optimal Deterrence in the Mass Tort Class Action, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2665, 2671 (2004) (“[T]he need to aggregate small recoveries to make unmarketable claims
into marketable class actions continues to sit close to the heart of Rule 23(b)(3).”); cf.
Rosenberg, supra note 266, at 564 (“Because defendant firms are in a position to spread the
litigation costs over the entire class of mass accident claims, while plaintiffs, being deprived
of the economies of scale afforded by class actions, can not, the result will usually be that the
firms will escape the full loss they have caused . . . .”).
276 Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir.1997); see also
David Korn & David Rosenberg, Concepcion’s Pro-Defendant Biasing of the Arbitration
Process: The Class Counsel Solution, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1151, 1194 (2013).
277 Class action critics often overlook pre-filing investigations by class counsel.
See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 4, at 222 (describing class actions as “simply piggyback[ing]
on the efforts of public agencies”). While many private enforcement cases follow
government enforcement, this does not necessarily undermine class actions’ potential
to provide consumers resiliency assets. See Howard M. Erichson, Coattail Class
271

272
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to news coverage, which helps spread information to putative
class members who otherwise may not have known they were
harmed.278 Litigation-related documents are publicly available
and one can search for similar claims.279 Greater information
about the extent of wrongdoing and harm suffered by consumers
is often unearthed during discovery.280
For class members still unaware of the alleged
wrongdoing, information about the class action is also provided to
consumers through Rule 23’s notice requirements. For example,
before a trial court will approve a settlement, class counsel
notifies class members of the pending settlement.281 This notice
helps overcome information vulnerabilities for putative class
members as well as consumers more generally. Class notice is
often mailed directly to class members and/or disseminated via

Actions: Reflections on Microsoft, Tobacco, and the Mixing of Public and Private
Lawyering in Mass Litigation, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 42 (2000) (“Not only do coattail
class actions add something of value to government actions in terms of compensation
and deterrence, but they are superior to non-coattail class actions as a matter of both
efficiency and legitimacy.”).
278 Press releases about newly filed consumer class action complaints are
commonplace. See, e.g., Class Action Complaint Against General Motors Company Filed
By Clark Fountain Law Firm In Response To False Safety Ratings, WALL ST. J.
MARKETWATCH (June 27, 2014, 5:09 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/classaction-complaint-against-general-motors-company-filed-by-clark-fountain-law-firm-inresponse-to-false-safety-ratings-2014-06-27; Christopher Zara, Twitter Spam Lawsuit:
Mobile Users Ambushed By Annoying Text Messages, Class Action Says, INT’L BUS.
TIMES (July 2, 2014, 4:06 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/twitter-spam-lawsuit-mobileusers-ambushed-annoying-text-messages-class-action-says-1618020.
279 See generally Pacer Brings Court Records to the Public, FED. LAW., Oct.
2009, at 44.
280 See, e.g., In re Pressure Sensitive Labelstock Antitrust Litig., 69 Fed. R.
Serv. 3d (West) 791 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (“During the course of discovery, Plaintiffs
uncovered evidence of what they allege broadened the conspiracy to encompass market
allocation and supply restriction, and that this conduct began as early as January 1,
1996.”); see also D. Theodore Rave, Settlement, ADR, and Class Action Superiority, 5 J.
TORT L. 91, 116 (2012) (discussing how abbreviated opportunities for discovery may
hinder knowledge of the full extent of defendants’ wrongdoing).
281 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX CIVIL LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21.633 (2004). The notice
must be “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of
the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” See,
e.g., Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
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mass media.282 These notices educate putative class members, as
well as consumers who are not part of the class.283
By permitting consumers to participate in class actions, the
responsive state can also provide information resiliency in a
slightly different way. Class actions can prompt stronger
governmental investigation of corporate wrongdoing.284 For
example, private class actions spurred governmental investigation
of corporate wrongdoing in the insurance industry.285 Class counsel
brought suit on behalf of consumer policy holders claiming
deceptive practices regarding vanishing premium insurance
policies in the 1980s.286 These class actions triggered insurance
commissioners in 30 states to create a task force to investigate the
allegations and provided over a million consumers redress.287
Hence, by supporting the use of class action mechanisms, the
responsive state can provide consumers multiple resilience assets
to lessen information vulnerabilities.
Third, incentivizing judicial participation can help
overcome consumers’ vulnerability in the face of judicial
favoritism towards corporations. Class actions provide consumers
much-needed opportunities to be heard288 (i.e. opportunities to
exercise their political voice).289 Ensuring consumers have

282 See, e.g., Johnson v. Gen. Mills, Inc., No. SACV 10-00061, 2013 WL 3213832
(C.D. Cal. June 17, 2013) (“[T]he class notice plan conducted by The Garden City Group,
Inc. was successful and notice was disseminated through ‘nationwide magazine print
publications, hundreds of highly trafficked websites including Facebook.com and
Yahoo.com, a national newspaper magazine distributed through more than 800
newspapers across the country, and through a press release that had the opportunity to
be picked up by more than 1,100 nationwide English and Spanish news outlets and
blogs.’”); In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., No. 06-MD-1738, 2012 WL 5289514, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2012) (detailing direct mail and mass media notice campaign).
283 Increased consumer information can empower consumer decision-making in
the marketplace. See Robert H. Lande, Proving the Obvious: The Antitrust Laws Were
Passed to Protect Consumers (Not Just to Increase Efficiency), 50 HASTINGS L.J. 959, 963
(1998) (discussing how information promotes consumer sovereignty in the marketplace).
284 See Samuel Issacharoff, Group Litigation of Consumer Claims: Lessons
from the U.S. Experience, 34 TEX. INT’L L.J. 135, 138 (1999).
285 Id.
286 See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 962 F. Supp.
450, 474 (D.N.J. 1997), aff’d, 148 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 1998).
287 See Prudential Ins. Co., 962 F. Supp. at 480; Scot J. Paltrow, Panel’s
Settlement with Prudential Could Be Delayed, L.A. TIMES, July 4, 1996, at D1; see also
Issacharoff, supra note 284, at 138.
288 Opportunities for consumers to be heard are notably on the decline in the
neoliberal period. COLIN CROUCH, THE STRANGE NON-DEATH OF NEOLIBERALISM 151 (2011)
(“[P]ublic debate in many of our societies is dominated by a small number of corporate
media enterprises, with other giant firms limiting the scope of serious debate . . . .”).
289 In using the term “voice”, I do not mean to implicate the “voice-loyalty-andexit typology” used to challenge class actions. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 145. Rather, I
use the term “voice” more in the general participatory context.
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avenues to air grievances promotes the overall fairness of the
legal system, which generates resiliency for society as a whole.
In terms of voice, class actions can help overcome judicial
favoritism towards corporations by providing consumers a voice
regarding how much or how little enforcement should exist.
Through class actions the responsive state provides a forum for
debate. The settlement approval process is a key example of how
class actions can afford opportunities to be heard. Before class
action settlement approval, the court elicits and evaluates class
members’ responses,290 including the rate of claims made; the
number of opt-outs; and any objections about the adequacy and
fairness of a proposed settlement.291 By participating in class
actions, consumers can actively take part in this legal/electoral
process, making their voices heard not only in the settlement
process, but, if successful, in corporate boardrooms and
legislative chambers.
By encouraging participation in class actions, the state
can also increase additional societal resilience reserves. Class
actions allow consumers a way to advance the fairness of the
legal system.292 Strengthening the perceived fairness of the
legal system encourages cooperation with the civil justice
system. Stated differently, by participating in class actions,
consumers can strengthen society’s larger compliance with
laws. When procedures are considered fair, people are more
likely to “obey the law” and have greater respect for the legal
system generally.293 Conversely, when court procedures do not
prioritize constituents’ needs, there are increased risks of

See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 281.
See, e.g., In re Ikon Office Solutions, Inc. Sec. Litig., 194 F.R.D. 166, 197 (E.D.
Pa. 2000) (discussing how objections that “sharpen debate” about the adequacy of a
settlement are entitled to attorney fees); In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., 148
F.R.D. 297, 358 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (same). While the objection process expands participation,
this process has also been abused by anti-class action crusaders who attack the class
settlement on principle rather than based on the particularities of the case. Further,
objectors who advance criticism solely for a payday equally frustrate the participatory
potential of the settlement approval process. See generally Bruce D. Greenberg, Keeping the
Flies Out of the Ointment: Restricting Objectors to Class Action Settlements, 84 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 949 (2010) (detailing the issues with class action objectors).
292 See, e.g., Carideo v. Dell, Inc., 520 F. Supp. 2d 1241, 1246 (W.D. Wash.
2007) (discussing class actions as a mechanism for providing a public good); Charles v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 976 F. Supp. 321, 327 n.3 (D.N.J. 1997) (“The class action
suit is designed to serve the ‘public good’ . . . .”); Luff, supra note 146, at 74 (“Class
actions, in addition to serving individual needs, also serve the ‘public good.’”).
293 See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 4-6 (1990); Tom R. Tyler,
The Psychology of Disputant Concerns in Mediation, 3 NEGOTIATION J. 367, 368 (1987).
290
291
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discontent and mistrust of the legal system.294 A responsive
state can avoid this discontent by enhancing consumers’ access
to class action mechanisms. Professor Tom Tyler’s work on
procedural justice fleshes out this point by explaining:
[P]eople defer to rules primarily because of their judgments about
how those rules are made, rather than their evaluations of their
content. Judgments about the fairness of decision-making
authorities have been found to be more central to a rule’s legitimacy,
and to people’s willingness to accept it, than are judgments of
decision favorability. In other words, people are willing to defer to
laws and legal authorities on procedural justice grounds.295

According to procedural justice theory, the intangible
value of ensuring judicial fairness matters more than the
potential monetary compensation available in class actions.296
As an interview with a named class member highlights, the
perception that the judicial system allows consumers to fight
back has value: “I knew the money was not, I mean, we got a
little bit but that wasn’t the motivation [in bringing suit]. It
was more just kind of to fight back, I guess.”297
Rather than recognize these participatory gains, class
action critics point out how collective action denies consumers
from fully participating in the adversarial process because such
cases often settle rather than proceed to trial.298 To bolster this
argument, critics may point to low claims rates in damages
class actions.299
294 See Donna Shestowsky & Jeanne Brett, Disputants’ Perceptions of Dispute
Resolution Procedures: An Ex Ante and Ex Post Longitudnal Empirical Study, 41
CONN. L. REV. 63, 72 (2008).
295 Tom R. Tyler, Compliance with Intellectual Property Laws: A Psychological
Perspective, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 219, 231 (1997); see also TYLER, supra note
293, at 176 (“People feel that their membership and status in the group are confirmed
when their views are heard and considered, irrespective of the decisions made by the
third party.”); Jody Clay-Warner, Perceiving Procedural Injustice: The Effects of Group
Membership and Status, 64 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 224, 225-26 (2001); Jan-Willem van
Prooijen et al., Procedural Justice and Status: Status Salience as Antecedent of
Procedural Fairness Effects, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1353, 1354 (2002).
296 See, e.g., Shestowsky & Brett, supra note 294, at 68.
297 Stephen Meili, Collective Justice or Personal Gain? An Empirical Analysis of
Consumer Class Action Lawyers and Named Plaintiffs, 44 AKRON L. REV. 67, 94 (2011).
298 Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the
Class Action, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 151 (2003) (“In short, class actions today serve
as the procedural vehicle not ultimately for adversarial litigation but for dealmaking
on a mass basis . . . .”).
299 See, e.g., Gail Hillebrand & Daniel Torrence, Claims Procedures In Large
Consumer Class Actions and Equitable Distribution of Benefits, 28 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 747, 747 (1988) (arguing low claims rates in consumer class actions suggest the
claims are ill-suited for class action procedures); Sheila B. Scheuerman, The Consumer
Fraud Class Action: Reining in Abuse by Requiring Plaintiffs to Allege Reliance as an
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But it is that very deal-making potential that makes
class actions an option for consumer resilience. Without class
actions, consumers’ ability to deal-make, by exchanging their
legal claims for money or other redress by corporations, is lost.
Again, the union analogy seems appropriate. Whereas an
individual employee would likely not have enough money to bring
suit individually against his employer, in the collective form of a
union, the playing field is at least a bit more level.300 Thus, the
resilience potential of class actions is not defined by whether a
class action settles or proceeds to trial. As for low claim rates,
one can turn this argument on its head by arguing that low
claim rates highlight the necessity to facilitate larger
participation rather than pointing to the need to deprive this
avenue of participation altogether.301
More fundamentally, these criticisms can sometimes make
the perfect the enemy of the good. With the onslaught of legislative
and judicial activism to reform and minimize class actions, the
question is not whether class actions provide equal voice compared
to other kinds of “individual vs. individual” cases—like a
straightforward neighbor dispute or breach of contract claim.
Rather, the real query is whether allowing individuals some voice
in the class action context advances participatory goals better than
none. As Professor Stempel explains:
What these critics overlook is that class actions were designed in
large part to give voice to claims that would otherwise not be
brought at all . . . . Measured against this goal, class actions can fall

Essential Element, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 9 (2006) (using low claims to justify
increased reliance standards in consumer fraud class actions).
300 See Michael J. Zimmer, Inequality, Individualized Risk, and Insecurity,
2013 WIS. L. REV. 1, 25 (“[T]here is a positive correlation between the extent of
unionization and the general level of economic equality.”); see also ROBERT KUTTNER,
EVERYTHING FOR SALE: THE VIRTUES AND LIMITS OF MARKETS 100 (1997) (describing
how unions are “a force for greater equality, because they promote[ ] a more egalitarian
distribution of earnings”).
301 For example, providing class notices with language appropriate for
laypersons could potentially increase claims-rates. See Todd B. Hilsee et al., Do You
Really Want Me to Know My Rights? The Ethics Behind Due Process in Class Action
Notice Is More Than Just Plain Language: A Desire to Actually Inform, 18 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 1359, 1365 (2005) (“The [Federal Judicial Center] found that ‘converting
the notice to plain language is not the only way to improve communications with class
members . . . experience tells us that attorneys and judges can significantly improve
class members’ motivation to read and comprehend class action notices by changing the
language, organizational structure, format, and presentation of the notice.’”); see also
Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty and Client Autonomy in
Non-Class Collective Representation, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519, 555 (2003) (“The
Federal Judicial Center has undertaken a project to improve the readability of class
action notices by designing notices using plain language . . . .”).
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short of the individualized adjudicative ideal and nonetheless
provide considerable social value.302

Thus, a responsive state can promote consumer resiliency
by encouraging participation in class actions. Rather than
financial inequalities creating default wins for corporations,
permissive class action mechanisms allow individuals to ban
together. In doing so, the state allows consumers a forum for
grievances, while simultaneously offering consumers financial
and information resiliency. As a result, the state can move one
step closer to objectives that enhance justice rather than favoring
private or profit motivations.303
B.

Class Actions Protect Consumers From Future Harm

In addition to enhancing consumer participation in the
judicial system, class actions also allow the responsive state to
build consumers’ resiliency to corporate risk-taking. Increasing
deterrence partially offsets consumers’ financial and information
vulnerability. Deterred wrongdoing means consumers suffer less
financial harm. Further, there is less wrongdoing to uncover,
making information disparities between corporations and
consumers less relevant.
The threat of class action exposure “deters risky
behaviors . . . and results in safer products and better corporate
practices.”304 The U.S. judiciary,305 scholars,306 and foreign
302 Jeffrey W. Stempel, Class Actions and Limited Vision: Opportunities for
Improvement Through A More Functional Approach to Class Treatment of Disputes, 83
WASH. U. L. Q. 1127, 1131 (2005).
303 Cf. Fineman, Beyond Identities, supra note 57, at 1762 (“Political
responsibility precedes and is an essential complement to the idea of personal
responsibility, which focuses only on individual autonomy and free-market ideals.”).
304 See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, CAFA’s Impact on Litigation As A Public
Good, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2517, 2550 (2008); see also Joshua D. Blank & Eric A.
Zacks, Dismissing the Class: A Practical Approach to the Class Action Restriction on the
Legal Services Corporation, 110 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1, 13-14 (2005) (“The mere possibility
of a class action lawsuit may encourage a government or private agency to change its
behavior without engaging in litigation.”); William B. Rubenstein, Why Enable
Litigation?: A Positive Externalities Theory of the Small Claims Class Action, 74 UMKC
L. REV. 709, 711 (2006).
305 In the United States, decades ago, deterrence was a recognized goal of private
enforcement class actions. For instance, the Supreme Court previously cited deterrence to
justify granting treble damages in private antitrust classes. See, e.g., Am. Soc’y of Mech.
Eng’rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 572 n.10 (1982) (citing Reiter v. Sonotone
Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 344 (1979)) (“Congress created the treble-damages remedy . . . precisely
for the purpose of encouraging private challenges to antitrust violations. These private suits
provide a significant supplement to the limited resources available to the Department of
Justice for enforcing the antitrust laws and deterring violations.”).
306 See, e.g., Leah Bressack, Small Claim Mass Fraud Actions: A Proposal for
Aggregate Litigation Under RICO, 61 VAND. L. REV. 579, 593 (2008); Klonoff, supra
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countries have all recognized class actions’ deterrent potential.307
Even Judge Posner, who has actively promoted the blackmail
myth, recognizes how class actions can “prevent the defendant
from walking away from the litigation” without paying a full
recovery because of practical obstacles to individual distribution.308
In fact, the primary substantive laws pursued as class actions, such
as civil rights, antitrust, and securities, were enacted not
merely for compensatory relief but to pressure potential
defendants to deter future misconduct.309
In this way, class actions pressure corporations—not to
settle310 but, rather, to avoid unlawful behavior.311 Class actions
raise potential transactional costs for corporations who seek to
engage in illegal conduct. These costs incentivize avoiding such

note 11, at 830 (“The threat of a class action also provides deterrence against
wrongdoing.”); Jay Tidmarsh, Superiority As Unity, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 565, 580 (2013)
(“[I]ndividual litigation may impose no loss of autonomy but may yield less deterrence
than a class action.”); David Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation
Functions in Mass Tort Class Actions for Future Loss, 88 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1874 (2002).
307 For example, the office of Fair Trading and the European Commission, as
well as the U.K. government, have openly acknowledged how class actions expand the
number of investigated cases, have deterrence value, and promote greater awareness of
substantive legal claims. See CIVIL JUSTICE COUNCIL, IMPROVING ACCESS TO JUSTICE
THROUGH COLLECTIVE ACTIONS: DEVELOPING A MORE EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE
PROCEDURE FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 13 (John Sorabji et al. eds., 2008), available at
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/judicial-institute/files/Improving_Access_to_Justice_through_
Collective_Actions_-_final_report.pdf. That said, the E.U. has yet to wholesale accept
U.S.-style class actions and advances compensation as the primary goal of private
enforcement. See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement, 63
VAND. L. REV. 675, 700 (2010) (noting the E.U.’s White Paper analysis “shies away from
U.S.-style class actions”); COMM’N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, WHITE PAPER ON
DAMAGES ACTIONS FOR BREACH OF THE EC ANTITRUST RULES 3 (2008).
308 Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., 356 F.3d 781, 784 (7th Cir. 2004).
309 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 1.8 (5th ed. 2013).
Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act which, in addition to compensatory elements, has
punitive and deterrence goals. Diamond Chem. Co., Inc. v. Akzo Nobel Chem. B.V., 517 F.
Supp. 2d 212, 218 (D.D.C. 2007); In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 557 F. Supp. 1091,
1105 (N.D. Ill. 1983), rev’d in part, 744 F.2d 1252 (7th Cir.1984) (internal citation omitted).
This is equally true for securities cases. See, e.g., Derdiarian v. Futterman Corp., 223 F.
Supp. 265, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (“Quite clearly the [securities] statutes relied on here are
meant to deter bad practices in the sale of securities.”); William O. Douglas & George E.
Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171, 173 (1934) (“The civil liabilities
imposed by the Act are not only compensatory in nature but also in terrorem. They have
been set high to guarantee that the risk of their invocation will be effective in assuring that
the ‘truth about securities’ will be told.”); George D. Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics: The
“Salvage” Factor in Counsel Fee Awards, 69 HARV. L. REV. 658, 663 (1956) (“[T]he record of
litigated cases is prophylactic—a deterrent to future wrong-doing. Every successful suit duly
rewarded encourages other suits to redress misconduct and by the same token discourages
misconduct which would occasion suit.”).
310 See supra Part III.B (discussing why corporate defendants’ settlement
pressures are illusory).
311 See generally Rosenberg, supra note 306, at 1872 (discussing deterrence effect).
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behavior in the first place.312 Rather than viewing this pressure
as a problem, from a resiliency standpoint, this pressure means
consumers can lessen and ameliorate individual vulnerability
by proactively warding off future financial harm.313
Class actions offer consumers an alternative avenue to
affect corporate conduct. As consumers, individuals are limited
to their roles as passive agents—hampered by their lack of
power to impact market conditions.314 But as putative class
members, consumers can enforce compliance with legal and
moral norms315 and thus “participate in decisions and activities
that affect [their] well-being.”316 Class actions maximize
society’s total welfare by encouraging potential wrongdoers to
refrain from undertaking unreasonable risks.317 For example,
class actions can improve consumer safety by ensuring
accountability for corporations that knowingly sell dangerous
products. Alternatively, a company may elect to spend more
money testing a new product pre-release or invest in more
compliance training to minimize potential class action exposure.
This deterrent effect has the potential to stimulate
widespread change.318 Class actions provide consumers resilience
against wrongdoing not only from named corporate defendants
but also from other industry members.319 This deterrent effect
312 See Jared N. Jennings et al., The Deterrent Effects of SEC Enforcement and
Class Action Litigation 8 (Working Paper, Dec. 2011), available at http:ssrn.com/
abstract=1868578.
313 Cf. Fineman, Equality, supra note 32, at 22.
314 See Orit Dayagi-Epstein, Furnishing Consumers with a Voice in Competition
Policy (Working Paper, 2005), available at http://luc.edu/media/lucedu/law/centers/antitrust/
pdfs/publications/workingpapers/dayagi_epstein_consumers_voice.pdf
315 Eran B. Taussig, Broadening the Scope of Judicial Gatekeeping: Adopting the
Good Faith Doctrine in Class Action Proceedings, 83 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1275, 1358 (2009).
316 See Dayagi-Epstein, supra note 314, at 2; Taussig, supra note 315, at 1358; see
also CAROL C. GOULD, RETHINKING DEMOCRACY: FREEDOM AND SOCIAL COOPERATION IN
POLITICS, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 21-22, 32, 39 (1988); ARDITH MANEY & LOREE BYKERK,
CONSUMER POLITICS: PROTECTING PUBLIC INTERESTS ON CAPITAL HILL 16 (Greenwood Press
1994). Through class actions, consumers also have the potential to affect government action.
Private enforcement gives consumers an alternative way to spur additional government
responsiveness. Such litigation has the likelihood to influence the agenda of governmental
agencies charged with enforcing regulation. See Dayagi-Epstein, supra note 314, at 2.
317 See Rosenberg, supra note 306, at 1880.
318 This widespread effect is not limited to consumer class actions. See Trevor
W. Morrison, Private Attorneys General and the First Amendment, 103 MICH. L. REV.
589, 590 (2005) (“From school desegregation to fair housing, environmental
management to consumer protection, the impact of the private attorney general
litigation is rarely confined to the parties in a given case.”).
319 See Michael K. Block & Jonathan S. Feinstein, The Spillover Effect of Antitrust
Enforcement, 68 REV. ECON. & STATE 122, 122 (1986) (discussing how antitrust deterrence
is most effective when targeted at other firms in the same industry as the violator); cf.
Jennings, supra note 312, at 8. A 2011 empirical study analyzed both SEC and class action
enforcement of securities laws and found class actions curb aggressive reporting behaviors
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applies across industries and can extend over multiple years so
long as there is sustained and reported enforcement activity.
Thus, without liberal class action mechanisms, most class
members will suffer twice: first, they will be denied judicial access
to redress defendants’ wrongdoing because of financial and
informational barriers; and second, they forego the potential
deterrent effect of bringing suit.
To minimize this deterrence potential, class action
criticism often falls into two camps. Some squabble about the
vagaries of quantifying this deterrent effect.320 Others assume
class actions introduce the danger of over-deterrence.321
Admittedly, quantifying deterrence is difficult as it
requires proving a non-event, namely deterred illegal conduct.322
Though unlike the unsubstantiated blackmail myth, there is
some evidence that class actions can impact corporate conduct.
For example, in interviewing corporate representatives in 2000
(when there were fewer barriers to class actions than there are
today), the Rand Institute found:
[C]orporate representatives . . . interviewed said that the burst of
new class litigation had caused them to review financial and
employment practices. Likewise, some manufacturers noted that
heightened concerns about potential class action suits sometimes
have a positive influence on product design suits.323

of industry peers—not just the corporation sued. Id. While not the focus of this article, the
deterrent effect of securities class actions is still relevant for evaluating consumer class
actions as both are brought against corporate defendants.
320 See, e.g., Marilyn F. Johnson, In re Silicon Graphics Inc.: Shareholder
Wealth Effects Resulting from the Interpretation of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act’s Pleading Standard, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 773, 784 (2000) (“[I]mprecise
deterrence is worse than no deterrence.”); A.C. Pritchard, Markets As Monitors: A
Proposal to Replace Class Actions with Exchanges As Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85
VA. L. REV. 925, 958 (1999) (“[C]lass actions offer, at best, a very imprecise and
expensive form of deterrence.”).
321 See, e.g., Kovacic, supra note 6, at 1041 (“[T]he U.S. style of private rights
of action . . . pose[s] serious risks of overdeterrence.”). But see Luff, supra note 146, at
80-81 (“Critics assume that overdeterrence is a problem of the class action mechanism;
research and common sense, however, show otherwise.”). Some courts use the
blackmail myth to confirm the fears of overdeterrence. See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc
Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298-99 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting potential for class actions to
“blackmail” defendants into settling frivolous claims (quoting HENRY J. FRIENDLY,
FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 120 (1973)).
322 See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Securities Class Actions As Pragmatic
Ex Post Regulation, 43 GA. L. REV. 63, 92 (2008) (“The impossibility of precisely
measuring potential class litigation’s ex ante incentives on a corporate agent
contemplating wrongdoing may make it a fool’s errand . . . .”).
323 RAND REPORT, supra note 144, at 119; see also Sherman, supra note 210, at
232 (providing a more exhaustive analysis of the Rand Report).
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More significantly, though, the quantum of deterrence is
less important than ensuring some deterrence. Some
deterrence is evidently needed, as a PricewaterhouseCooper
survey illustrates economic corporate crime rates have steadily
increased.324 As a result, over-deterrence concerns may be
overblown: over-deterrence is a concern most closely associated
with negligent conduct, whereas consumer class actions often
involve intentional conduct.325
Further, it is not that class actions offer perfect
deterrence;326 rather, class actions’ potential for at least some
resiliency against harm justifies more expansive class action
mechanisms. As Professor Campos explains, “The relevant
trade-off is not between the deterrence provided by the class
action and the accuracy provided by the individual trial. The
trade-off is between optimal deterrence and imperfect
compensation versus no deterrence and compensation at all.”327
Fears of over-deterrence assume enforcement by public entities
is sufficient.328 This ignores how private enforcement, including
class actions, is more effective in providing deterrence than
government regulation.329 No matter how dedicated to consumer
protection, government actors often cannot devote sufficient
324 Anecdotal evidence suggests the current economic downturn has increased
corporate misconduct. See, e.g., The Rot Spreads: Corporate Crime is On the Rise, supra
note 228 (discussing results of PricewaterhouseCoopers survey indicating “[t]he
recession has taken its toll on morals as well as profits”).
325 See Robert W. Taylor, Re-Evaluating Holder Actions: Giving Defrauded
Securities Holders A Fighting Chance, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 413, 427 (2011); cf.
Curtis-Universal, Inc. v. Sheboygan Emergency Med. Servs., Inc., 43 F.3d 1119, 1123
(7th Cir. 1994) (commenting that “antitrust violations [are] based on deliberate rather
than inadvertent actions”); Wiley v. Gerber Prods. Co., 667 F. Supp. 2d 171 (D. Mass.
2009) (detailing consumer class action “alleging various claims under Massachusetts
and New Jersey state law sounding in fraud, breach of warranties and intentional
misrepresentation”); Jaramillo v. DineEquity, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 2d 908, 912 (N.D. Ill.
2009) (describing putative class action for intentional misrepresentations).
326 Other scholars reach the same middle ground of recognizing class actions
are hardly perfect regulators, but they are still worth encouraging. See, e.g., Burch,
supra note 304, at 2519 (admitting class actions are “not perfect regulators” but still
recognizing the important rule of such cases).
327 Sergio J. Campos, Proof of Classwide Injury, 37 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 751,
800 (2012).
328 See, e.g., Luff, supra note 146, at 81 (“Following administrative action with class
actions, according to critics, yields only excessive penalties rather than increased deterrence.”).
329 See, e.g., Michael G. Dupee, Federalism or Futility? Suter v. Artist M. and Its
Effect on § 1983 Actions to Enforce Spending Clause Statutes, 16 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. &
POL’Y 135, 182 (1994) (“[P]rivate enforcement . . . has often been cited as a much more
effective method of policing government compliance.”); Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis,
Benefits from Private Antitrust Enforcement: An Analysis of Forty Cases, 42 U.S.F. L. REV.
879, 897 (2008) (“[I]t is safe to conclude that private enforcement is significantly more
effective at deterring illegal behavior than DOJ criminal antitrust suits.”); see also Georgene
Vairo, What Goes Around, Comes Around: From the Rector of Barkway to Knowles, 32 REV.
LITIG. 721, 803 (2013).
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resources to enforcement.330 Governmental regulatory agencies
lack the financial resources to monitor and detect all
wrongdoing.331 Moreover, government enforcement alone is
unlikely to provide consumers sufficient resiliency. Class actions
offer consumers a broader array of damages and remedies than
available from governmental enforcement—which results
primarily in injunctive or restorative relief.332
Government enforcement is also hindered by political
constraints.333 For example, there are reasons to question the
FTC’s ability to sufficiently monitor consumer protection
violations.334 Studies show the FTC is unlikely to pursue claims
against constituents of legislators serving on committees with
FTC oversight responsibility.335 Further, by its own admission,
the FTC lacks the requisite resources to fulfill its “broad
competition and consumer protection responsibilities.”336 Hence,
class actions offer consumers greater resiliency by providing the
more consistent enforcement that is necessary for a deterrent
effect. Unlike government enforcement, which wavers by
administrative interest, politics, and economic resources,337
private class actions have the potential for more constant
regulatory oversight—and thus greater resiliency gains.338

330 See ROBERT N. MAYER, THE CONSUMER MOVEMENT: GUARDIANS OF THE
MARKETPLACE 39-40 (1989) (discussing limitations government agencies face in advancing
consumers’ interests).
331 RAND REPORT, supra note 323, at 69.
332 Sherman, supra note 210, at 236 (“In addition, when governmental
agencies do undertake enforcement actions, their powers may lead only to injunctive or
restorative relief and not to the broad range of damages and remedies available in a
class action. Thus it is in providing alternatives to government regulation through the
role of private attorneys general that the consumer class action might make a winner
out of consumers at large.”).
333 RAND REPORT, supra note 323, at 69.
334 Andrew A. Caffrey, III & Jonathan M. Rotter, Consumer Protection, Patents
and Procedure: Generic Drug Market Entry and the Need to Reform the Hatch-Waxman Act,
9 VA. J. L. & TECH. 1, 38 (2004) (arguing that, in the context of the FTC, “the limitations of
the agency make the consumer class action suit a superior means of enforcement”).
335 M. L. GREENHUT & BRUCE BENSON, AMERICAN ANTITRUST LAWS IN THEORY
AND IN PRACTICE 181-82 (1989); Bruce Benson, Why are Congressional Committees
Dominated by “High Demand” Legislators?, 48 S. ECON. J. 68, 68-77 (1981); Roger L.
Faith et al., Antitrust Pork Barrel, 25 J.L. & ECON. 329, 329-42 (1982); Richard A.
Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 83 (1969).
336 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC’s Thomas B. Leary Addresses Class
Action Litigation Summit (June 26, 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2003/06/ftcs-thomas-b-leary-addresses-class-action-litigation-summit.
337 Joseph P. Bauer, Reflections on the Manifold Means of Enforcing the
Antitrust Laws: Too Much, Too Little, or Just Right?, 16 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 303,
310-11 (2004); Spencer Weber Waller, The Incoherence of Punishment in Antitrust, 78
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 207, 230 (2003).
338 Bartholomew, supra note 195, at 2151; Bauer, supra note 337, at 310-11.
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Class actions supplement limited government regulatory
enforcement. As private attorney generals, consumers likely have
more deterrent impact than their government counterparts.
Antitrust class actions provide a solid illustration. Private
enforcement of antitrust violations is disproportionately left to
class actions.339 Consumer class actions are the dominant form of
private antitrust enforcement in the United States.340 Federal,
private antitrust cases exceed United States government actions
(civil and criminal) by more than 25 to 1341
Thus arguments about the need to protect markets from
overdeterrence are a variation on the blackmail myth. Just as
corporations are not being pressured into settlements by class
actions, the market is not suffering from an overabundance of
private regulation. To the contrary, the last decade’s
Congressional and judicial reforms of class actions raise
significant questions about what potential deterrent effects have
already been lost.342 In limiting class actions, consumers’
resiliency to lessen future harm is lost, thus increasing their
financial and information vulnerability.343

339 See, e.g., Crane, supra note 307, at 676. Securities class actions have seen
similar insufficient governmental enforcement. From 2002-2005, post-securities class
action reform through the PSLRA but before the start of increased procedural hurdles
in 2007, the majority of monetary sanctions for reporting violations come from private
enforcement rather than public enforcement. In fact, securities class actions have
generated 40% more monetary fines from culpable firms than the SEC. Jennings, supra
note 312, at 8 (“Over the years 2002-2005, the average payments made by culpable
firms on account of SEC monetary sanctions total $801 million relative to $1.923 billion
attributable to class actions rewards and settlements.”).
340 Bartholomew, supra note 195, at 2157 (“[A]t least ninety percent of
antitrust enforcement is addressed through private actions.”); see also BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE:
ANTITRUST CASES FILED IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS BY TYPE OF CASE, 1975–2006,
available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5412006.pdf.
341 Bartholomew, supra note 195, at 2151; Stephen Calkins, An Enforcement
Official’s Reflections on Antitrust Class Actions, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 413, 431 (1997) (“With
respect to redress, however, government civil cases have not been an effective
surrogate for, or even supplement to, private class actions.”).
342 See, e.g., Klonoff, supra note 11, at 735 (“[T]he emergence of myriad cases
that cut back the ability to pursue classwide relief represents a troublesome trend that
undermines the compensation, deterrence, and efficiency functions of the class action
device.”); Byron G. Stier, Crimtorts, Class Actions, and the Emerging Mass Tort Method,
17 WIDENER L.J. 893, 897 (2008) (discussing how “the greater scrutiny afforded class
actions means that small-value class actions may not be certified” resulting in
underdeterrence); Genevieve G. York-Erwin, The Choice-of-Law Problem(s) in the Class
Action Context, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1793, 1794 (2009) (“CAFA’s jurisdictional shift appears
to be weakening enforcement, resulting in underdeterrence and perhaps greater
corporate misbehavior.”).
343 Cf. Coyle, supra note 33, at 71 (discussing how corporate influence on
governmental institutions results in less development of individual assets essential for
resilience); Fineman, Anchoring Equality, supra note 22, at 20.
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C.

Class Actions Advantage Consumers by Reducing
Economic Disparity

Third, class actions are a mechanism by which
consumers can reduce economic disparities. In this way, class
actions provide an alternative type of participation: enhanced
participation in the marketplace. This enhanced marketplace
participation generates consumers resiliency by providing an
institutional means of improving the economic standing of
consumers vis-à-vis large corporations, thus helping overcome
financial vulnerability and judicial favoritism.344 Such a
mechanism is justified from a vulnerability perspective given
“the unavoidable realization that when corporations act
primarily with a profit motive they can both intensify their own
precariousness and generate hazards for society.”345
In making this point, the intent is not to trigger
politically-loaded debates over wealth transfers, nor is the
argument that class actions are the only or most ideal way to
reduce economic disparities. Rather the point is to consider how
strengthening class actions could be another way the responsive
state can address consumers’ financial vulnerabilities—
particularly in a time when more traditional mechanisms, such as
increased corporate taxation, seem politically unattractive
alternatives to some.346 Thus, while wealth redistribution is a
contentious proposition, in terms of vulnerability it is a
relevant physical resiliency asset.
Consumers’ resilience is dependent on maximizing
opportunities to place themselves on more “even terms with the
firms . . . who might otherwise dominate them.”347 It has long been
recognized that heavy concentration of wealth can undermine
economic and political democracy.348 Extreme wealth concentration
can stunt economic growth.349 Further, it can generate political

See Fineman, Anchoring Equality, supra note 22, at 19.
Fineman, Equality, supra note 32, at 25.
346 Cf. id. (discussing the state’s willingness to protect “the vulnerable position
of certain big businesses” without necessarily affording individuals similar protection).
347 CROUCH, supra note 288, at 53.
348 See id. at 53; see also Alan Krueger, Inequality, Too Much of Good Thing,
in INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 1 (Benjamin F. Freidman ed., 2003) (“[I]ncome inequality
[would be] problematic in a democratic society if those who are privileged use their
economic muscle to curry favor in the political arena and thereby secure monopoly
rents or other advantages.”).
349 See, e.g., Winnie Byanyima, Working for the Few: Inequality and the Threat to
Democracy, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 24, 2014, 5:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
winnie-byanyima/working-for-the-few-inequ_b_4643748.html.
344

345
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instability.350 Class actions offer consumers one form of resiliency
against such wealth concentrations, and thus are institutional
responses the state should encourage to help consumers respond
to the rise of wealth concentration.
In the current anti-class action paradigm, consumers’
options to influence the market are primarily limited to purchasing
decisions and occasional market research.351 However, through
class actions, consumers can fight against judicial favoritism
stemming from corporations’ financial power and thereby limit
corporations’ ability to abuse their economic advantage over
consumers. These forced monetary distributions have the potential
to reshape the marketplace and improve social welfare.352
Enhanced class action mechanisms also offer resiliency
against corporate favoritism.353 Distributions from corporations to
class members can often represent significant amounts of money.
For example, from 2006 to 2007 consumer class action settlements
totaled close to $3 billion.354 Though this figure is just one onethousandth of post-tax corporate profits in the same period,355 it is
difficult to identify another mechanism by which consumers
impact the marketplace on an equal or larger scale. To curb class
actions means limiting this avenue of resiliency.
Through class actions, consumers’ potential to impact the
marketplace is not limited to monetary distributions to the
individual. Class actions provide consumers resilience by allowing
them to play a role in protecting the marketplace’s economic
freedom and fostering more potential for competition. 356 This is
350 See, e.g., Andrew G. Berg & Jonathan D. Ostry, Equality and Efficiency, 48
FIN. & DEV. 12, 14 (2011) (“Beyond the risk that inequality may amplify the potential
for financial crisis, it may also bring political instability, which can discourage
investment.”).
351 See CROUCH, supra note 288 at 56.
352 This power is particularly relevant to consumer resiliency in the neoliberal
period, where corporate responsibility is narrowly defined in terms of maximizing state
value with little consideration for larger social goals. See id. at 136.
353 See Fineman, Equality, supra note 32, at 25-26 (discussing how the state
played favorites in the recent economic bailout by helping big business but limiting
help to individual mortgage holders).
354 See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and
Their Fee Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811, 825 (2010) (discussing settlement
amounts for various cases, listing antitrust and consumer cases separately).
355 See Corporate Profits After Tax (without IVA and CCAdj), ECON. REA.: FED.
RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS, http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/CP/ (last updated Mar.
27, 2015) (detailing how corporate profits in 2006-2007 were roughly $1,400 billion).
356 See, e.g., Acme Mkts., Inc. v. Wharton Hardware & Supply Corp., 890 F. Supp.
1230, 1236 (D.N.J. 1995) (“Thus, courts generally find that competitors and consumers are
proper parties because the antitrust laws are intended to protect the economic freedom of
participants in the relevant market.” (internal citation omitted)); see also Midland Exp., Ltd.
v. Elkem Holding, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 163, 167 (E.D. Pa. 1996). This more competitive market
also has the potential of greater consumer welfare by fostering innovation, which improves
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particularly true for antitrust consumer class actions. Private
enforcement of antitrust laws allows consumers a means of
attacking abuse of market power, be it through leveraging
monopolies, price-fixing, or other illegal restraints.357 By
disrupting anticompetitive conduct, private enforcement limits
corporations’ ability to extract supracompetitive prices from
consumers,358 while shaping the market as a whole by making
room for potential competition.359
Admittedly, the reduction of economic disparities, alone,
is not enough to overcome vulnerability.360 Class action
settlement distributions do not result in a net gain by class
members. Monetary settlements or post-trial judgments in
class actions actually represent a return of wrongly obtained
funds, as damages in such cases are limited to compensatory
damages.361 Still, without mechanisms for aggregate litigation,

options for consumers. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of
Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC
AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 619-22 (Richard Nelson ed., 1962). But see JOSEPH A.
SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 84-85 (1942) (questioning the
degree antitrust law enhances consumer welfare).
357 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2004). Perhaps the largest limitation on consumers’
ability to enforce antitrust laws was Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 730
(1977) where the Court held that only direct purchasers could sue under federal law to
recover antitrust damages. In the dissent, Justice Brennan noted the decision’s danger
to enforcement, stating the decision “flouts Congress’ purpose and severely undermines
the effectiveness of the private treble-damages action as an instrument of antitrust
enforcement.” Illinois Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 749 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
358 See, e.g., Robert H. Lande, A Traditional and Textualist Analysis of the Goals
of Antitrust: Efficiency, Preventing Theft from Consumers, and Consumer Choice, 81
FORDHAM L. REV. 2349, 2351 (2013) (“[T]he overriding purpose of antitrust statues is to
prevent firms from stealing from consumers by charging them supracompetitive prices.”).
359 It is often stated that antitrust laws are intended to protect consumers. See,
e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (describing the Sherman Act as a
“consumer welfare prescription”); see also John B. Kirkwood, The Essence of Antitrust:
Protecting Consumers and Small Suppliers from Anticompetitive Conduct, 81 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2425, 2469 (2013) (“Congress and the American people want an antitrust system that
protects consumers and small suppliers from exploitative behavior—behavior that takes
their wealth without providing them with offsetting benefits.”). However, the overall benefit
to competition as a whole still is worth noting. See, e.g., Covad Commc’ns Co. v. Bell Atl.
Corp., 398 F.3d 666 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (antitrust law protect competition); Holmes Prods.
Corp. v. Dana Lighting, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 27, 32 (D. Mass. 1997) (“At the outset, this Court
works from the premise that antitrust law protects ‘competition, not competitors.’” (citing
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977)).
360 See Coyle, supra note 33, at 68.
361 While treble damages are possible from consumer antitrust class actions,
they are rarely awarded or reflected in settlement figures. See Robert H. Lande, Five
Myths About Antitrust Damages, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 651, 662 (2006) (“[O]verall, the
awarded antitrust damages are only a fraction as large as they should be to ensure
optimal deterrence, and that they should be increased significantly.”).
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corporate defendants would continue to gain wealth at the
expense of consumers.362
Further, beyond improving the economic position of class
members, consumer class actions also result in significant
payments to charities and non-profit agencies. When settlement
funds remain after distribution to class members, these funds
are distributed as cy pres to third-parties on behalf of the class
members.363 These third parties include charities, such as the
Make a Wish Foundation, Susan G. Komen Breast Cancer
Foundation,364 American Red Cross Disaster Relief Fund,365 and
non-profit agencies like the New York University Medical
Center, the Beth Israel Medical Center’s Continuum Women’s
Cardiac Care Network,366 the National Consumers League, and
the Consumers Union.367 Consequently, class actions generate
resiliency by supporting organizations that provide individuals
safety nets for times of misfortune.368 This resiliency asset is
particularly valuable since charities are already feeling the
pinch of a sluggish economy.369
Charitable distribution amounts can be significant.
Class actions have allowed consumers to fund public benefits
ranging from music distributed to libraries and educational
institutions,370 promoting financial literacy,371 and enforcing

362 Cf. Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 702 F.3d 359, 362 (7th Cir. 2012) (“A class
action is a more efficient procedure for determining liability and damages in a case such as
this involving a defect that may have imposed costs on tens of thousands of consumers, yet
not a cost to any one of them large enough to justify the expense of an individual suit.”);
Lande & Davis, supra note 329, at 889 (discussing a multi-year study proving consumer
antitrust class actions, alone, generated settlements totaling $1.815 billion).
363 See generally Christine P. Bartholomew, Charitable Settlements, FORDHAM L.
REV. (forthcoming 2015) (detailing charitable distributions history and judicial application).
364 In re Motorsports Merch. Antitrust Litig., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1392, 1396-99
(N.D. Ga. 2001).
365 In re Infant Formula Multidistrict Litig., No. 4:91-CV-00878, 2005 WL
2211312 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 8, 2005).
366 Masters v. Wilhelmina Model Agency, Inc., 473 F.3d 423, 432 (2d Cir. 2007).
367 In re LivingSocial Mktg. & Sales Practice Litig., 298 F.R.D. 1 (D.D.C. 2013).
368 See, e.g., Tidmarsh, supra note 306, at 572 (discussing the social welfare gains
from class actions); accord Allan Erbsen, From “Predominance” to “Resolvability”: A New
Approach to Regulating Class Actions, 58 VAND. L. REV. 995, 1000 n.4 (2005) (“Class actions
potentially promote social welfare by overcoming collective action problems inherent in the
regulation of conduct affecting disorganized groups.”). Defendant class actions also have the
potential to enhance social welfare. See generally Francis X. Shen, The Overlooked Utility of
the Defendant Class Action, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 73, 79 (2010) (discussing how defendant
class actions can serve the goals of maximizing social welfare).
369 John F. Wasik, How to Choose a Charity Wisely, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/08/giving/how-to-choose-a-charity-wisely.html?
pagewanted=all&_r=0.
370 In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price Antitrust Litig., 216 F.R.D.
197 (D. Me. 2003).
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consumer rights.372 A 2003 consumer class action settlement
resulted in $38 million going to charitable governmental and
non-profit organizations to promote the health and nutrition of
class members.373 The 2006 Microsoft consumer antitrust case
settlement resulted in Wisconsin public schools receiving over
$80 million.374 Thus, settlements to third parties can help
finance valuable organizations and the beneficiaries of these
organizations, who are often class members.
Rather than embracing class actions’ potential for
economic resiliency, critics often contend class actions only lessen
the economic disparity between defendants and class counsel—
not class members. Hence, one rhetorical trick is for critics to
claim class members only receive pennies while class counsel
receives millions.375 This attack ignores that in the aggregate,
class members’ “pennies” can still represent a notably large
benefit to consumers.
It is undeniable that a successful class action settlement
will result in a significant payday for class counsel. But
arguably, this payout is a good thing for consumers. It
encourages counsel to continue undertaking highly risky
litigation, where there is no guarantee of payout.376 Without
willing counsel, consumers’ class claims cannot be brought.377

371

Fla. 2011).

In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 830 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1355 (S.D.

372 See, e.g., LaGarde v. Support.com, Inc., No. 12-0609, 2013 WL 1994703 (N.D.
Cal. May 13, 2013) (approving settlement with charitable distribution to two consumer
advocacy groups); In re Publ’n Paper Antitrust Litig., No. 3:04 MD 1631, 2009 WL
2351724, at *2 (D. Conn. July 30, 2009) (ordering that a cy pres award in an antitrust
class action be distributed to the American Antitrust Institute, finding that “[b]ecause the
plaintiffs’ claims here are based on antitrust injury, the next best use for the settlement
funds is to disburse those funds to charitable institutions designed to guard against
antitrust injury and protect consumers”).
373 See In re Vitamin Cases, 107 Cal. App. 4th 820, 824 (2003).
374 See
Microsoft
Wisconsin
Cy
Pres
Plan,
MICROSOFTWIK12,
https://microsoftwik12.com/ (last updated Oct. 31, 2014) (detailing the settlement terms).
375 See, e.g., Dan Kelly, Class Action Suits Enrich Lawyers While Consumers Get
Pennies, READING EAGLE , Dec. 31, 2003, at A1; Eleanor Laise, Picked Clean:-Plaintiff ’ s
Attorneys and Middlemen Thrive under the Securities Class-Action System; What’s in it
for You? Pretty Much Bupkis, SMARTMONEY, May 2005, at 81, 81 (describing class action
suits as thriving but stating that the supposed plaintiff-beneficiaries often receive
pennies on the dollar or small nonmonetary compensation, while lawyers have turned
such lawsuits into an industry for collecting large fees).
376 See, e.g., King v. United SA Fed. Credit Union, 744 F. Supp. 2d 607, 615 (W.D.
Tex. 2010) (“[Class Counsel] has asked no client or Class member to pay fees or advance
costs. Class Counsel have received no compensation for their efforts in this case. Absent the
settlement, there was a no guarantee that the Settlement Class members would obtain
relief from Defendant or compensation for their work on behalf of Plaintiffs and the Class.”);
377 See supra Part III.B (discussing consumers’ financial vulnerability).
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As Judge Jones recently noted in approving a settlement in a
consumer class action against T-Mobile:
The
practices
that
led
to
this
lawsuit
cost
most class members between a few cents and a dollar, on
average. . . . Almost no one would file a lawsuit to recover a dollar or
less. Collectively, however, T-Mobile may have profited several
million dollars as a result of these practices. While almost no one
would sue to recover less than the cost of a cup of coffee, the court
also expects that almost no one would be comfortable with the notion
of a company making millions by unfairly charging millions of its
customers a few extra pennies. Currently, the class action is the
most widely used solution to this dilemma.378

Moreover, 85% of class action revenues go to class
members or charities, while only roughly 15% of settlements go
to class counsel.379 While this 15% represents a sizable amount
of money, it is a necessary cost to achieve class actions’
redistributive effects. Moreover, 15% is typically lower than the
take of other contingency-fee lawyers in individual litigation,380
which does not generate the same scope of resiliency benefits
as class actions.
While wealth distribution discussions often generate heated
debate,381 the reality is class actions are a way for consumers to
lessen economic disparity and “accumulate the resilience or
resources that they need to confront the social, material, and

378 Zaldivar v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 07-CV-1695, 2010 WL 1611981, at *1
(W.D. Wash. Mar. 16, 2010).
379 See Fitzpatrick, Lawyers, supra note 275, at 2085-86 (discussing how class
action attorneys should make more money in order to maximize the social welfare
benefits of class actions); Fitzpatrick, supra note 354, at 813.
380 See Lester Brickman, ABA Regulation of Contingency Fees: Money Talks,
Ethics Walks, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 247, 248 (1996) (noting that “standard contingency fees”
are “usually thirty-three percent to forty percent of gross recoveries” (emphasis omitted));
Fitzpatrick, Lawyers, supra note 275, at 2083; Joni Hersch et al., An Empirical Assessment
of Early Offer Reform for Medical Malpractice, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. S231, S238 (2007)
(referencing “the more typical one-third contingency fee rate”); F. Patrick Hubbard,
Substantive Due Process Limits on Punitive Damages Awards: “Morals Without
Technique”?, 60 FLA. L. REV. 349, 383 (2008) (mentioning “the usual 33-40 percent
contingent fee”) (internal quotation omitted); Herbert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The
Returns of Contingency Fee Legal Practice, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 267, 286 (1998) (reporting the
results of a survey of Wisconsin lawyers, which found that “[o]f the cases with a [fee
calculated as a] fixed percentage [of the recovery], a contingency fee of 33% was by far the
most common, accounting for 92% of those cases”).
381 One incarnation of this debate appears in some of the critiques of THOMAS
PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2014). Some argue that concerns
about wealth inequity are overblown while others argue it is a significant issue in need of
more wealth transfer. See, e.g., Debating Piketty’s Theory on How Wealth Begets Wealth,
Widens the Economic Gap, PBS NEWSHOUR (May 13, 2014, 6:38 PM), http://www.pbs.org/
newshour/bb/debating-pikettys-theory-wealth-begets-wealth-widens-economic-gap/.
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practical implications of vulnerability.”382 Collectively with
participatory and deterrent resiliency potential, enhancing
consumer class actions becomes a viable way for the responsive
state to empower consumers.
CONCLUSION
The battle over class action mechanisms is still raging.
With ever-growing corporate concentration and the corresponding
emergence of the mega-global corporation, class actions will
continue to suffer in the near future. This struggle is exacerbated
as class action critics advance false-cries of corporate victimhood.
The current anti-class action rhetoric overlooks how procedural
form impacts consumers’ participation in the judicial system and
the marketplace. Rather than embracing class actions, their
resiliency potential has been undermined by increased barriers.383
As previously detailed, these barriers now impact virtually every
stage of a class action, making it more difficult for consumers to
bring claims, let alone proceed as a class.384 These barriers
undermine the state’s potential to respond to consumers’
vulnerabilities, exacerbating consumers’ potential harm.385
Vulnerability theory provides a framework to envision a
different future: one where consumers have the potential for
more equal footing in seeking redress and influencing corporate
decision-making. Instead of the blackmail myth shaping the
future of class actions, judges and policymakers should
embrace class actions as a means to offer consumers resilience.
This would allow class actions to more effectively overcome
consumer vulnerability.
Applying vulnerability theory to class actions justifies
class action reform—reform that consciously benefits class
plaintiffs, not corporate defendants. Class action procedural
rules should not be net-neutral. Instead, rules that favor
382 See Fineman, Equality, supra note 32, at 19; see also Fineman, Anchoring
Equality, supra note 22, at 13 (explaining the role of the state is provide resilience).
383 The increased gatekeeping hurdles in class actions are well-documented.
See, e.g., Bartholomew, supra note 195, at 2185-86 (detailing the increased procedural
gatekeeping in antitrust class actions); Lazaroff, supra note 13, at 46-51. For a
thorough discussion of increased gatekeeping under the Roberts Court, see generally
Wasserman, supra note 14. The consequences to class actions are equally stark. See
Miller, supra note 183, at 476 (“We are moving toward a system in which an increasing
number of civil actions may be stillborn.”).
384 See Bartholomew, supra note 195, at 2185-86; Hovenkamp, supra note 165, at 55.
385 Nancy E. Dowd, Fatherhood and Equality: Reconfiguring Masculinities, 45
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1047, 1079-80 (2012) (“Conversely, the lack of state action may intensify
vulnerability, or negative policies may exacerbate or create more intense vulnerability.”).

2015]

REDEFINING PREY AND PREDATOR

805

plaintiffs are necessary to empower class actions. To advance
towards this re-envisioned future, the first step must be
debunking the need for greater corporate protection from class
actions. It is time to redefine prey and predator.
Once consumer welfare becomes the guiding light of class
action reform, what becomes interesting and warrants more
discussion is how to reinvigorate class actions to further advance
resiliency. The nuances of this reform are beyond the scope of this
Article, though I offer some beginning suggestions here.
Initial considerations for reform include some moderate
proposals. Legislation that rolls back some of the Supreme
Court’s recent class action reforms, such as the repeal of
Concepcion, Italian Colors, and Twombly, is a logical starting
point. These changes would allow courts to focus on whether a
wrong has occurred instead of allowing procedural hurdles to
preclude such determinations and advantage corporations.
Without legislative repeal of both pro-corporate
decisions, consumer class actions are stalled from their infancy,
with little hope of success for the vast majority of claims. Stare
decisis principles make judicial correction of these cases
unlikely, leaving redress for these missteps to Congress. Thus,
swift action is needed to protect consumer class actions.
Unfortunately, legislative efforts to correct these decisions
have failed or are stymied in Congressional gridlock.386 There is
hope, though, that as the impact of years of class action reform is
felt, legislative reform may find more success.
Perhaps, though, this reform agenda need not be so
narrow. Given the 30 years neoliberalism has had to undermine
class actions, more drastic proposals may be necessary for true
change. More sweeping proposals are particularly justified here,
since the pro-corporation narrative stems from judicial activism—
in essence, a state institution is responsible for this distortion.
The most radical proposal is adding statutory minimums
for computing class action claims. This would simplify damage
calculations and allow federal courts to streamline the largest
386 For example, the Open Access to Courts Act of 2009, which would have
returned pleading standards to pre-Twombly requirements, stalled after hearings in the
House and Senate. See Pamela Gilbert & Victoria Romanenko, Proposals for Reform, in
PRIVATE ANTITRUST LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 369 (2012) (discussing legislative reform
efforts potentially impacting private antitrust suits). Equally gloomy are the chances that
the Arbitration Fairness Act, which would overturn Italian Colors, will pass. Arbitration
Fairness Act, S. 878, 113th Cong. (2013). After over five years of winding through the
legislative process, GovTrack.gov—a legislative tracking tool—places the odds of
passage remain at only 6%. See S. 878 (113th): Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s878 (last visited Mar. 30, 2015).
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hurdle to class certification, the predominance requirement under
Rule 23.387 Doing so allows the parties to focus on arguments more
related to claims’ merit rather than procedural hurdles. This
helps overcome class members’ procedural disadvantage in
private enforcement class actions.
A second proposal is precluding corporate defendants
from recouping class action payouts through product cost
increases. Some argue corporate defendants recover settlement
costs by raising the price for products they sell.388 Doing so
essentially means consumers are financing their own settlements
through future purchases. The logistics of such a prohibition are
complicated, at best, but could include continued monitoring and
a shifting burden whereby after a class judgment or settlement, a
corporate defendant has to justify price increases for a
reasonable period.
As more scholars work on redefining class actions from
a vulnerability perspective, additional reform ideas will be
generated. Such research can potentially identify new options to
increase “equality of opportunity.”389 To be clear, class actions are
not a panacea, but they do work towards lessening individual
consumer vulnerability. Hence, the current judicial strategy of
class action retrenchment is not the answer. Instead, the
government should more actively protect and, in fact, encourage
expanded reliance on Rule 23. In doing so, the responsive state
can arm consumers in their efforts to fight against corporate
wrongdoing rather than leaving consumers to waive the white
flag of defeat.

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
See, e.g., Lisa M. Bass, The Class Action Fairness Act: What’s Fair About
It?, 2 BUS. L. BRIEF 23 (2005) (“To protect consumers from losing entire awards and
incurring the costs of class action suits through increased prices, and to protect
businesses from state courts which give excess awards, Congress proposed the Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005.”); cf. Bradley J. Bondi, Facilitating Economic Recovery and
Sustainable Growth Through Reform of the Securities Class-Action System: Exploring
Arbitration As an Alternative to Litigation, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 607, 612 (2010)
(discussing how “companies must raise the prices of their goods and services” to
respond to class action litigation).
389 Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 22, at 256.
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